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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses elements of the legal process of consent to the dona-
tion of ‘spare’ embryos to research, including stem-cell research, and
makes a recommendation intended to enhance the quality of that
process, including on occasion by guarding against the invalidity of
such consent. This is important in its own right and also so as to maximise
the reproductive treatment options of couples engaged in in vitro fertilisa-
tion (IVF) treatment and to avoid possible harms to them. In Part 1, with
reference to qualitative data from three UK IVF clinics, we explore the
often delicate and contingent nature of what comes to be, for legal
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purposes, a ‘spare’ embryo. Theway in which an embryo becomes ‘spare’,
with its implications for the process of consent to donation to research, is
not addressed in the relevant reports relating to or codes of practice
governing the donation of embryos to research, which assume an unprob-
lematic notion of the ‘spare’ embryo. Significantly, our analysis demon-
strates that there is an important and previously unrecognised first stage
in the donation of a ‘spare’ embryo to research, namely: consent to an
embryo being ‘spare’ and so, at the same time, to its disuse in treatment.
This is not explicitly covered by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
(HFE) Act 1990, as amended by the HFE Act 2008. Having identified this
important initial stage in the process of consent to the donation of a
‘spare’ embryo to research in conclusion to Part 1, in Part 2 we analyse
the idea of consent to an embryo’s disuse in treatment on the basis that
it is ‘spare’ with reference to the legal elements of consent, namely infor-
mation as to nature and purpose, capacity, and voluntariness. We argue
that there are in fact three related consent processes in play, of which
the principal one concerns consent to an embryo’s disuse in treatment.
If the quality of this first consent is compromised, in turn this will
impact on the quality of the consent to the donation of that ‘spare’
embryo to research, followed by the quality of consent to future cycles
of assisted reproduction treatment in the event that these are needed as
a result of a donation decision. The analysis overall is of central relevance
to the debate as to whether, and if so when, it should be permissible to
request the donation of fresh embryos for research, as opposed to those
that have been frozen and, for instance, have reached the end of their
statutory storage term. This has a particular bearing on the donation of
embryos to stem-cell research since there is a debate as to whether fresh
embryos are most useful for this.
Keywords: Donation of fresh or frozen embryos to research, including stem-cell
research; Quality and validity of consent for donation of embryos to research;
Ethical and legal issues in donation of fresh or frozen embryos to research
INTRODUCTION
Embryo research, including stem-cell research, may use ‘spare’ embryos
that pass from the assisted reproduction clinic to the research labora-
tory. The donation of such embryos to research requires the consent
of the donating couple.1 On its face, the question of when an embryo
1 The relevant provisions of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE)
Act 1990, as amended by the HFE Act 2008, are discussed in Part I, S.I,
and III, and further in Part 2.
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is ‘spare’ appears relatively simple: for example, an embryo that is not
needed because a couple has decided not to pursue further treatment,
or one that is deemed ‘unsuitable for treatment’, for instance according
to embryology criteria. However, the idea that an embryo is ‘unsuitable
for treatment’ and therefore ‘spare’ is not as straightforward as it may
at first appear. Rather, this conclusion may be surprisingly delicate and,
in some circumstances, contingent. Analysis of the decision-making
process that an embryo is ‘spare’ in fact raises a number of significant
questions about the extent of the information about and control regard-
ing any given embryo that a couple may and should have, and so about the
quality of their consent to the donation of any given embryo to research.
The purpose of our work is to analyse elements of the legal process of
consent to the donation of ‘spare’ embryos to research and, in the light
of this, to make a recommendation designed to enhance the quality of
that process, including on occasion by guarding against the invalidity
of such consent. This is important in its own right and also to maximise
the reproductive treatment options of couples engaged in in vitro fertil-
isation (IVF) and to avoid possible harms to them. Our work is of
central relevance to the debate as to whether, and if so when, it
should be permissible to request the donation of fresh embryos for
research, as opposed to those that have been frozen and, for instance,
have reached the end of their statutory storage term.2 This has a particu-
lar bearing on the donation of embryos to stem-cell research since there
is a debate as to whether fresh embryos are most useful for this.3 Given
the widely practised nature of assisted reproduction treatment and the
increased scope of domestic embryo research,4 coupled with the devel-
opment of stem-cell research here and overseas, the issues we address
are of considerable national as well as international significance.
2 This is now 10 years in the UK under the HFE Act 1990 (as amended), ibid,
s 14(4).
3 For conflicting views on this, see eg D Hoffman and others, ‘Cryopreserved
Embryos in the United States and their Availability for Research’ (2003) 79
Fertil Steril 1063–9, indicating that fresh embryos are better for stem-cell research.
For a contrary view, see A Sjo¨gren and others, (2004) 9 Reprod Biomed Online
326–9 which directly compares fresh and frozen embryos. In this study, ‘the effi-
ciency by which frozen-thawed embryos gave rise to new hES cell lines was 3.7
times better than with fresh surplus embryos’. The authors continue: ‘These find-
ings suggest that frozen-thawed embryos are superior to fresh surplus human
embryos in hES cell establishment, which also avoids specific ethical problems
associated with embryo donation in a fresh IVF cycle.’ (At 326.)
4 Permissible research purposes now transcend those relevant to reproduction
per se, and include:‘ . . . (a) increasing knowledge about serious disease or
other serious medical conditions, (b) developing treatments for serious
disease or other serious medical conditions, (c) increasing knowledge about
the causes of any congenital disease or congenital medical condition that
does not fall within paragraph (a).’ HFE Act 1990 (as amended), above n 1,
Sched 2, para 3A(2).
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We address our purpose in two stages: in Part 1, we consider how a deci-
sion is made that an embryo is ‘spare’, with attention to the relationship
between professional and patient input into this, highlighting the often deli-
cate and contingent nature of what comes to be, for legal purposes, a ‘spare’
embryo. Theway in which an embryo becomes ‘spare’, with its implications
for the process of consent to donation to research, is not in fact addressed in
the relevant reports5 relating to or codes of practice governing the donation
of embryos to research, which assume an unproblematic notion of the
‘spare’ embryo. Indeed, although the HFEA Code of Practice stresses ‘that
only fresh or frozen . . . embryos not required for treatment can be used
for research’, it makes no mention of the important decision-making
process that results in an embryo being labelled ‘spare’.6 The issue has
also received almost no academic, and within that no legal, attention.7
Significantly, our analysis in Part 1 demonstrates that there is an important
and previously unrecognised first stage in the donation of a ‘spare’ embryo
to research, namely: consent to an embryo being ‘spare’ and so, at the same
time, to its disuse in treatment. Since this stage is not explicitly covered by
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE) Act 1990, as amended
by the HFE Act 2008, its legal analysis requires some interpretation of the
HFE Act and surrounding law.
Having identified this important first stage in conclusion to our ana-
lysis in Part 1, in Part 2 we analyse the process of consent to donation,
with reference also to the common law relating to consent, showing that
there are in fact three interrelated consent processes at stake: consent to
an embryo being ‘spare’ and so to its disuse in treatment; consent to the
donation of that embryo to research; and consent to further fresh cycles
of assisted reproduction treatment in the event that these are necessary
as a result of a prior donation decision. In the light of our analysis,
we make a recommendation aimed at enhancing the legal quality of
these consents and the protection of reproductive futures.
5 Department of Health, Stem Cell Research: Medical Progress with Responsi-
bility, (Department of Health, London 2000) ,http://www.doh.gov.uk/
cegc.. House of Lords Select Committee on Stem Cell Research, Stem Cell
Research: Report from the Select Committee (The Stationary Office,
London 2002) 25.
6 HFEA, Code of Practice (8th edn, 2009, updated 2011), in force October
2011, para 22.7(h), our emphasis. The same wording was used in the 7th
edition (2007) para G.5.13.1(b); the 6th edition (2003) used the phrase
‘surplus to treatment’ (para 5.8(ii)). The MRC Steering Committee, Code of
Practice for the Use of Human Stem Cell Lines (Version 5, April 2010) like-
wise makes no reference to this aspect of the donation decision.
7 An exception from the perspective of ethics is S Holm, ‘The Spare Embryo – A
Red Herring in the Embryo Experimentation Debate’ (1993) 1 Health Care
Analysis 63–6. R Morgan’s ‘Embryonic Stem Cells and Consent: Incoherence
and Inconsistency in the UK Regulatory Model’ (2007) 15 Med Law Rev
279–319 is concerned with other important issues.
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Our discussion in both parts makes use of our qualitative research at
three UK clinics which provide IVF and which are also involved, directly
or indirectly, in the provision of embryos for stem-cell research.8
We interviewed 44 health professionals and scientists and also con-
ducted six ethics discussion groups (EDGs).9 The value of these
groups, which consisted of three to six participants, lay in the opportun-
ity for those involved to explore ethical issues that arose in the interviews
in some depth and as a member of a group of colleagues, guided by a
philosopher. Taken together, the interviews and the EDGs provide a
unique insight into what in practice may affect the determination of an
embryo as ‘spare’, with implications for the process of consent to dona-
tion that are explored particularly in Part 2. Our data were collected
between 2007 and 2009. Certain practices may have changed, but
ethical and legal issues remain about past, present, and future practice,
particularly the ongoing question of the circumstances in which fresh,
rather than frozen, embryos may be sought for donation to research.
PART 1: WHO DECIDES THAT AN EMBRYO IS ‘SPARE’?
I. INTRODUCTION
In this Section I, we first note the statutory provisions on consent to the
use or donation of embryos. In Section II, we analyse how an embryo
comes to be ‘spare’ with reference to clinics’ freezing policies. Lastly,
in Section III, we start to interpret the law as it applies to the relationship
between freezing policies and patient choice.
The statutory provisions on consent are contained in Schedule 3 of the
amended HFE Act 1990, compliance with which is a condition of a clinic’s
licence under section 12(1) of the Act.10 A couple must consent in writing
to the use of their embryos (and gametes) in their treatment, or to their do-
nation to research (or for use in training or in the treatment of others,
which do not concern us here).11 Either the man or the woman can with-
draw consent (for any of the above purposes, or to continued storage)
before an embryo’s use.12 For the purposes of donation to research, the
HFEA Code stipulates that ‘[e]mbryos will be regarded as having been
8 Above as detailed in the ‘asterisk’ note. For further details of this aspect of our
research, see K Ehrich, C Williams, and B Farsides, ‘Fresh or Frozen? Classi-
fying ‘Spare’ Embryos for Donation to Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research’
(2010) 71 (12-6) Soc Sci Med 2204–11.
9 The interviews were conducted by Kathryn Ehrich and the EDGs by Bobbie
Farsides.
10 See also HFEA, above, n 6, Licence conditions T57, R18.
11 HFE Act 1990 (as amended), above, n 1, Sched 3 paras 1(1) and 2(1).
12 Ibid, Sched 3, para 4(1)(2).
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used . . . as soon as they are under the control of the researchers . . . and are
being cultured for use in research’.13 As indicated above, we consider ques-
tions about the legal position regarding the degree of control that a couple
may have over their embryos that arise as a result of our analysis in the
final stage of this Part 1 (Section III), as a prelude to our further analysis
of the law in Part 2.
II. HOW AN EMBRYO COMES TO BE ‘SPARE’
In this section, we discuss some of the factors that affect the determination
of an embryo as ‘unsuitable for treatment’, some of which are intrinsic and
some contingent. The crucial factor on which we focus here is the freezing
policy of the clinic at which a couple is being treated. Research Manager
27 (Site 2) described the issue of freezing as ‘probably the thing that most
affects whether couples are getting material through to . . . research’,
adding, ‘I think that the differences between those policies in the different
places have quite radical effects.’ First, we give some short background
about embryo potential and freezing policies in general.
A. The Live-birth Potential of Each Embryo: Grading Issues
In debates about the moral status of the embryo, it is typically assumed
that all embryos in vitro have the potential to produce a live-born child.
In fact, this is not the case, since embryos vary enormously in their po-
tential to continue developing in vitro prior to, and in vivo after, trans-
fer. For simplicity, we will refer to this fact as ‘embryo quality’. For this
reason, embryos are initially assessed by embryologists in the first few
days after fertilisation (usually on day two and/or three) and graded
according to various (currently morphological) criteria, including the
number of cells they possess on any given day post-fertilisation and
the degree, if any, of fragmentation. As Embryologist 5 (Site 1)
observed: ‘I mean obviously an embryo is a being, you know, it’s a
mixing of the genetic material, it’s, you know, it is the start of something
but that doesn’t necessarily mean it is going to continue.’ Embryologists
monitor embryos daily with the aim of being able to select the best for
transfer to the uterus on day three or later. Whether embryos are trans-
ferred later than day three will depend on whether the clinic has the fa-
cility to culture the embryos to blastocyst stage, reached on day five or
six following fertilisation (which is becoming more common), and
whether there are enough embryos to justify trying to take them on to
this stage so as to make the best possible selection between them. Clin-
ician 37 (Site 1) referred to this selection process as ‘uncover[ing]
13 HFEA, above, n 6, ‘Interpretation of Mandatory Requirements’, Box 22B.
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embryo potential as much as possible’. The imprecise nature of the rela-
tionship between embryo quality and pregnancy potential means that
there will inevitably be some variation in the way embryos are graded
by different embryologists. That said, clinics try to overcome this by
standardising their assessments as much as possible, although the pres-
ence of some subjectivity in some cases appears inevitable with the
current criteria.14 As Embryologist 26 (Site 2) observes: ‘It’s . . . always
going to be an art in choosing to some extent.’
In short, despite the presence of a number of embryos as a result of
superovulation, not all embryos from a treatment cycle will have the
potential to produce a live-born child. However, provided sufficient
eggs are retrieved and fertilised, there is likely to be more than one
with this potential. In the first place, this raises the question of how
many to transfer to a woman’s uterus.
B. Transfer of Fresh Embryos
The question of how many embryos to transfer is an ethical issue in its
own right. This is because of the significant possibility of a multiple-
gestation pregnancy developing, with risks of greater complications
for the mother and/or fetuses during the pregnancy, with possible long-
term consequences in the born children, such as some degree of disabil-
ity as the result of prematurity.15 In 2003, the HFEA recommended that
in women under forty, a maximum of two embryos should be trans-
ferred, and a maximum of three in women over this age.16 The issue
received renewed attention in 2006 when the risks of multiple-gestation
pregnancies were addressed by an expert group convened to report to
the HFEA, which recommended that only one embryo should be trans-
ferred at a time in suitable cases, known as ‘single embryo transfer’
(SET).17 Accordingly, following a consultation process, the HFEA has
further revised the guidance in its Code.18
14 A related question here is whether there should be a national grading process
for embryos. There is an attempt to do this by the Association of Clinical
Embryologists and there is a published grading system for blastocysts.
15 See eg HFEA, Expert Group on Multiple Births after IVF, One Child at a
Time: Reducing Multiple Births after IVF (October 2006). Current figures
are that more than 25% of IVF pregnancies in the UK are still multiple,
that is, 40% of all IVF births are twins or triplets. See ,http://
www.oneatatime.org.uk..
16 See HFEA, The Scientific and Clinical Advances Group, ‘Embryo Transfer
Review’, SCAG(04/03)01, ,http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/SCAG_Embryo_
Transfer_April03.pdf..
17 HFEA Expert Group, above, n 15, Executive Summary, 8–9.
18 HFEA, above, n 6, T123: ‘The centre must not exceed the maximum multiple
birth rate specified by Directions.’ And see ‘Interpretation of Mandatory
Requirements’, Box 7A, and paras 7.1, 7.2.
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The number of embryos that remain after transfer will depend on the
number that were produced in any given treatment cycle. Since the
quality of each embryo is variable (and more will be known about
embryo quality if it has been possible to culture them to blastocyst
stage), the question will then arise as to whether the remainder, from
either a day three or day five/six transfer, can be frozen for possible sub-
sequent use. This takes us to the issue of the freezing policy of any given
clinic and whether, in the event that embryos are not frozen for subse-
quent clinical use, the remaining fresh embryos might be sought for re-
search, including stem-cell research.
C. Unpacking Clinics’ Freezing Policies
1. Numbers and Quality
Some clinics may have (or have had) a policy requiring a minimum
number of embryos, for instance three, before freezing a couple’s add-
itional embryos is recommended to them. There may be several elements
to this. First, as Embryologist 5 (Site 3) noted, less than 70% of day 3
cleavage stage (non-blastocyst) embryos survive thawing, although the
survival rate typically increases to near 90% if blastocysts (day five or
six) have been frozen. The rationale is that out of three thawed
embryos, there might be two suitable to transfer. Connected with this
is a concern about not raising false hopes in patients by preparing a
woman for a frozen embryo transfer and then finding that there is
only one or even none to transfer. In fact, the move towards SET and
increased use of blastocyst culture will impact on this issue, since a
cycle in which only one embryo is transferred in women under thirty-
five will become the norm, though subject to exceptions.
A second aspect of freezing policies concerns embryo quality. The
thought here, from a clinical perspective, is that it is not worthwhile
freezing poor-quality embryos and that this might give false hope to a
couple. However, an important issue is at what stage the final assess-
ment of embryo quality is made. If this is done at day three, for instance
because the clinic does not have the facility to culture embryos to blasto-
cyst stage or because there were not deemed enough embryos to justify
doing this, it may sometimes be the case that if those embryos had been
allowed to develop further, some of them may in fact have proved to
have good live-birth potential. The occasional unpredictability of
embryo development was noted by various participants in our study.
An important question in relation to embryo quality will be whether a
couple is informed of this possibility so that, if they wish, they can
choose to give one or more of those embryos (not those that are patently
non-viable) the chance of a pregnancy by having them frozen even if, on
the balance of probability, the assessment as to poor quality is more
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likely than not. Clinician 37 (Site 1), a clinic with the facility for blasto-
cyst culture, talked of ‘giv[ing] the embryos the benefit of the doubt . . .
Some of them against the odds, they continue to develop to a blastocyst
and we offer patients [the choice] to freeze them’.
Since there is a concern about the number of embryos that may survive
thawing, the financial cost of freezing and subsequent transfer of thawed
embryos needs to be considered. Some freezing policies are derived from
a ‘value for money’ perspective. If a couple would have to pay for the
freezing and then the intended replacement cycle (which may well
total over £1000), they would need to make a financial judgment—
taking into account also the clinic’s success at frozen replacement
cycles, and the estimated quality of the embryos and their likelihood
of surviving the freeze and thaw—as to whether this was financially
sensible, or whether they should instead elect for the woman to
undergo a further fresh cycle (where the chances of a birth following
may be higher because a clinic would be able to improve a woman’s
drug stimulation regime having learned lessons from her response to
the first cycle).19 However, they would also have to take into account
that a further fresh cycle carries increased risks for the woman, a
point addressed by some of our participants below.
We now turn to discuss the freezing policies of the sites we visited,
looking first at the site which had a ‘minimum-number’ policy.
D. Minimum-number Freezing Policy: Site 3
1. The Policy and its Underlying Rationale
At the time we visited Site 3 (our first site, in February to October 2008),
the policy was to recommend that a couple should have a minimum of
three good-quality embryos to justify freezing any from a given cycle.
The rationale is well stated by Embryologist 2:
[T]he policy is we usually . . . have a minimum of three to freeze for
a patient, a reasonable number for the patient. . . . The reasoning
behind that is that we usually have roughly about 65–70% survival
rate on the embryos. So if we freeze three, then hopefully we’ll have
at least two that will survive.
A relevant consideration, explained by Nurse 1, concerns the costs,
physical, emotional, and financial, of couples preparing themselves for
a frozen embryo transfer. As Embryologist 2 observes: ‘If the embryos
don’t survive the thaw, financially and emotionally and obviously
19 Personal communication: Peter Braude, Emeritus Professor, and former Head
of Department of Women’s Health/Centre for PGD, King’s College London.
Med. L. Rev. Donation of embryos to research 263
physically it’s quite traumatic for them to go through.’ The issue of
embryo quality is also, of course, relevant, as explained by Embryologist 4:
[W]e have very, very seldom frozen, if ever, an embryo that’s got a
quality of fewer than – that’s had a four or five grade. . . . Because
they don’t survive. They don’t do well anyway in a fresh cycle
and then if you put them through the trauma of freezing and
thawing, they don’t do well . . . it’s unfair to give patients unrealistic
false hope . . . when we know that it doesn’t work.
However, a number of interviewees commented on the possibility of
exceptions to the three-embryo freezing policy. In the first case, as Nurse
1 explains, this would be ‘where somebody can never do IVF again’, or,
as Embryologist 2 notes, ‘if they’ve . . . had . . . a particularly difficult
time actually in achieving . . . those embryos . . . so if the patient has
had to undergo a very difficult egg collection, say they’ve had to have
general anaesthetic or if the gentleman has been in and had to have . . .
a surgical procedure to remove the sperm’. A further exception, noted
by Embryologist 4, might be made if there is an embryo of particularly
good quality: ‘Sometimes if there’s less than three, if they’re very good
quality we’ll say, you know, “It’s up to you if you’d like to freeze
them.” Ultimately it is the patient’s decision’. A further exception at
the time of our interviews, which will increasingly become the norm in
women under thirty-five, will be the situation in which only one
embryo is to be transferred in order to reduce multiple pregnancy rates.
As Embryologist 2 observes in a comment echoed by Embryologist 4:
What we tend to say to patients who are only having one embryo
transferred is that we may decrease that minimum number to
two, in the hope that even if just one of them survives, there is a
good chance that [the] patient can just go ahead and have
another single embryo transfer again. We prefer them not to
freeze one embryo but it’s the patient’s decision at the end of the
day who say, against our advice, wants to freeze a single embryo.
Since the time of our interviews, this policy will also have been affected
by the clinic’s development of the ability to freeze blastocysts,
which Embryologist 4 noted would start in the next year or so (that
is, 2009/10).
2. The Balance between Professional and Patient Input into the Decision
that an Embryo is ‘Spare’
Despite the ‘minimum-number’ freezing policy, several of the intervie-
wees stressed that, at the end of the day, it was a matter of patient
choice. For instance, Embryologist 3 observed: ‘I think . . . couples
should be able to have one embryo frozen anyway if they’re prepared
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for the fact that they could go through all the setting up and what have
you and it not survive. Yes, I think the choice should be down to them
finally, yes.’ This was backed up for example by Embryologist 4.
Patients can only choose, of course, in the light of good information
and are likely to value highly the recommendations of the embryologists
that come with that information. However, an important question con-
cerns the strength and status of these recommendations and whether, in
effect, they amount to a decision that an embryo is ‘spare’. Strikingly,
Embryologist 4 observed:20 ‘I suppose for the majority of patients a
spare embryo is defined by us because we advise them. But that’s
what we do, is we advise them, we don’t tell them what to do.’ Although
s/he describes an embryo being defined as ‘spare’ by embryologists, s/he
is also keen to emphasise that this is just ‘advice’. However, if a couple
were to trust the advice that an embryo is ‘spare’ (and we do not suggest
at this point that this is necessarily inappropriate), then in fact there is
no decision remaining for them about its possible use in treatment:
the only decision would be whether to permit its discard or instead to
consent to donation to research. We draw out the important implica-
tions of this in the closing stages of this part of the article. The
limited scope for deciding what to do with an embryo that has
already been defined as ‘spare’—that is, ‘unsuitable for treatment’—is
reinforced by the following observation from Embryologist 2, who in
fact says: ‘The decision to select which . . . embryos are going to be trans-
ferred, frozen or donated to research or just allowed to perish, tends to
singly be with the . . . embryologist that’s just observing the embryos in
the morning.’21 Most importantly, this comment suggests that the em-
bryologist might effectively decide when an embryo is ‘spare’.
Not surprisingly perhaps, patients were reported to vary in their
responses to embryologists’ ‘recommendations’ and ‘advice’. As Embry-
ologist 7 observed: ‘[S]ome patients don’t want to know the details and
they’re quite happy for you to decide which are going to be donated to
research, which are going to go back [that is, to be transferred] . . . but
then you get other patients that question every little step of the
way.’22 How easy or otherwise patients might find it to go against
recommendations will obviously vary, a point of general relevance in
a variety of clinical settings. In this context, the point directly concerns
the important question of how much control couples have over the use
of their embryos in treatment and the decision that any given one is in
fact ‘spare’. Strikingly, Embryologist 5 made reference to patients
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[W]e have just frozen one embryo where patients have just been
adamant, ‘I want this embryo freezing.’ You know, we can’t say
no. It’s . . . patient choice at the end of the day. And as long as
they’re happy to accept the risk that this embryo may not survive,
then we would freeze it for them.
Embryologist 4, who above noted that ‘for the majority of patients a
spare embryo is defined by us’,23 in fact similarly appears to recognise
the place of patient choice, and likewise alludes to a requisite degree
of assertiveness on the part of patients seeking to question or override
recommendations, saying: ‘Ultimately it is the patient’s decision. We
can just advise them if they insist on having one relatively poor
embryo frozen, we can tell them we don’t think it’s a good idea, it’s un-
likely to survive. But if they want to, it’s their embryo, so it’s their
choice.’24
So far, these views suggest an awareness that, in the definition of a
‘spare’ embryo, there may be a delicate balance at stake between
patient autonomy on the one hand and patient trust on the other. The
importance of the latter may be particularly apparent in the following
account which describes the problems that may be generated when
poor quality embryos are frozen. Clinician 8, who was obviously
deeply concerned for his or her patients, drew attention to the potential
problems with ‘freezing everything’ (of the non-transferred embryos) re-
gardless, as it were, of quality, and therefore not, in fact, deciding that
some embryos are ‘spare’ after the initial transfer:
The ethical purist might say, ‘We have to freeze everything.’ But
then when you see the heartache it causes when this poor woman
has been worked up for embryo transfer . . . and has had her
hopes raised and then you pull those embryos out of freezing, it’s
not only if they don’t survive, it’s if they survive but they’re
falling apart in front of you . . . and the embryologist will tell her,
‘Look this isn’t going to work.’ And that’s the balance. You’re
trying to prevent too much of that unhappiness and complete point-
lessness really, whilst accepting that in a small number of cases, the
embryologist’s judgment may be wrong and an embryo that they
don’t think is worth freezing, might, in some cases, result in a
live birth. But, you know, where do you draw the line? Because if
you freeze everything you’ll get a few more babies per year but
an awful lot of unhappiness.
23 Our emphasis.
24 Our emphasis.
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However, and not disputing the points made here, a highly important
issue in relation to a ‘minimum-number’ freezing policy is that some-
times embryos that are of good quality might not be frozen for future
clinical use because there are, in effect, insufficient accompanying
embryos. Accordingly, such embryos will not be frozen unless a
couple somehow elects to disregard the freezing policy. This acutely
highlights the possibly contingent nature of the decision that an
embryo is ‘spare’.25 Strikingly, on the definition of an embryo as
‘spare’ and the minimum-number element of the freezing policy, Embry-
ologist 7 observed:
I think it’s very easy for an embryologist to explain when a poor
quality embryo is spare and can go for research . . . [Y]ou can . . .
say, ‘It’s arrested in its development, or it’s very fragmented, the
chances of it surviving freezing, thawing . . . .’ . . . What is more dif-
ficult is for say a patient has four good quality embryos, has two put
back and you say, ‘Well you’ve got two left, the unit, to get a good
chance with your frozen, normally we would recommend three or
more to freeze . . . ’. Obviously it’s their choice whether they have
them frozen, but then that’s two good embryos. So they’re not ne-
cessarily poor quality and spare, they’re actually good quality and
spare, but that’s harder to explain to the patient.26
In this example, the two embryos that are of good quality but not frozen
are defined as ‘spare’ because the clinic’s assessment is that less
than 70% of day 3 cleavage stage (non-blastocyst) embryos survive
thawing and so, to be reasonably sure to have two embryos to transfer
after thawing (in suitable cases), three need to be frozen. There is an al-
ternative, however, which would be to ‘bank’ embryos: that is, freeze
them in batches of less than three. The drawback with this, as Embry-
ologist 7 observes, is that patients would have to pay on each occasion.
In this light, this participant speaks of the difficulties of ‘getting the
balance right for the patient from the money side and their chances’
and observes that it is hard ‘when a patient’s got one good embryo
spare and you, in effect, discard it’.27 The clinic at Site 3 was in a
poorer area of the UK so that cost (given limited NHS provision for
treatment services) was a particularly significant issue for many patients.
At this point, the interviewer asked: ‘So what is a spare embryo in one
place, the same embryo might not be a spare embryo in another
25 Regarding other empirical work here see also M Svendson and L Koch,
‘Unpacking the ‘Spare Embryo’: Facilitating Stem Cell Research in a Moral
Landscape’ (2008) 38/1 Soc Stud Sci 93–110, 97.
26 Our emphasis.
27 Our emphasis.
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place?’, to which Embryologist 7 replied ‘Yes’. Significantly then, in the
case of viable embryos remaining after transfer, whether an embryo is
deemed ‘unsuitable for treatment’ and therefore ‘spare’ will turn on
the freezing policy of any given clinic, subject to patients electing to
override this where they have the will and the finances (where they
have to pay for freezing themselves) to do so.
In the light of the above discussion, we suggest that the word ‘spare’
may not be really appropriate to describe these viable embryos. Rather,
some embryos are in effect deemed unusable—not because of their
quality—but because the lack of additional viable embryos means that
they will not be frozen if the freezing policy is followed. This is highly
significant given that ethical guidance relating to and debates regarding
the use of embryos for research assume that such embryos are in some
straightforward sense ‘not required for treatment’ and therefore unprob-
lematically ‘spare’: although the HFEA Code stresses ‘that only fresh or
frozen . . . embryos not required for treatment can be used for research’,
it makes no comment about the decision-making process that results in
an embryo being labelled ‘spare’.28 We will begin to develop the legal
implications of this below, in preparation for our principal analysis of
the legal issues relating to consent to the donation of ‘spare’ embryos
to research in Part 2. For now, as observed some years ago by Søren
Holm, the idea of the ‘spare’ embryo is not in fact a ‘natural category’.29
E. No Minimum-Number Freezing Policy—Embryo
Quality Only: Sites 1 and 2
1. The Policy and its Underlying Rationale
As we have seen, freezing policies are affected by whether a clinic has the
facility for blastocyst culture, since there is a very good chance that a
blastocyst will survive the thawing process and will have good live-birth
potential. The clinics at Sites 1 and 2 (which we visited from May to
September 2009, and October 2008 to May 2009, respectively) had
the facility for blastocyst culture and freezing, and did not have a
policy of only freezing a minimum number of embryos. At Site 1, for in-
stance, the interviewer asked: ‘[I]t sounds as though for every patient
who has any kind of good enough quality, then you freeze?’ Research
Manager 32 responded: ‘Then you freeze, yes.’ On the question of freez-
ing or not freezing single embryos, Nurse 39 (Site 1) observed:
[T]he first thing that springs to mind for me is it only takes one
embryo to implant and create a pregnancy, and so if you do have
an embryo that you would deem good enough quality to freeze,
28 HFEA, above, n 6, our emphasis.
29 Holm, above, n 7, 64.
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why would you then say to a patient, ‘Don’t freeze it because you’ve
only got one.’ . . . I don’t see why it shouldn’t be offered, because if
your patient has all the information, then it’s up to them to be able
to say, ‘Actually, you know, I don’t want to go ahead.’
Genetics Scientist 33 (Site 1) observed: ‘[A]s far as I am aware, all
couples will ask to have any, you know, their other ones, which are suit-
able, frozen if they’ve got to the right stage, yes.’ Nurse 22 described a
similar situation at Site 2:
[I]t’s the clinic policy to recommend freezing even if you only have a
single embryo that’s of good enough quality, and it’s up to you . . .
and then we have a conversation afterwards about what to do if
you’ve only got one embryo frozen, maybe try another fresh cycle. . .
The last point alludes to the possibility of ‘banking’, also discussed for
instance by Clinician 30. The policy of freezing only one embryo applies
with particular force in relation to blastocysts, given their greater preg-
nancy potential. Stem-cell Scientist 26 (Site 2) observed: ‘But we will
freeze, especially one blastocyst, given that we’re only putting one
blastocyst back . . . ’.
2. Patient Choice and the Possible Impact of Donation on Future
Treatment
A significant aspect of the freezing policies in both clinics appeared to
concern awareness and recognition of the importance of patient
choice. For instance, Stem-cell Scientist 41(Site 1) observed:
[I]f we took a fresh embryo, like a surplus one, and we say we’re not
going to freeze this, so we’re not giving them the chance I suppose
. . . and we say to them, ‘Here’s your choice, we can’t put it back
because you’ve already got however many, and that’s our policy.
So it’s either destroy or research.’ Then that’s not giving . . . the
patient a sort of choice.
On the question of patient choice and the developing role of patients in
decision-making, there was discussion in an EDG at Site 1 of the way in
which, in the past, patients might have deferred fully to the embryolo-
gists, saying for instance, as Embryologist 50 put it: ‘Oh you’re the
experts, I’ll run with you’, but ‘[n]ot now’ since ‘[a] lot of people’ use
the Internet to gain information about their treatment. With a view to
patient choice, there was also evidence of a willingness to freeze
embryos with less than clear potential on occasion. Embryologist 26
(Site 2) observed:30
30 Our emphasis.
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But something that is just outside of, just slightly outside of what we
normally do and the patient felt very strongly about it . . . because
they’re theirs, then it would be very difficult to say ‘no’ – particularly
since we can’t say absolutely that they won’t survive, and absolutely
that they wouldn’t implant.
Notably apart from concerns about the importance of patient choice
in relation to embryos, there was also a significant concern about the
possible impact on a patient’s treatment options if that choice is
reduced, including a clinical concern that a woman should not have to
undergo any potentially avoidable cycles of IVF. This is put well by
Nurse 22 (Site 2):
But you may be, by not freezing an individual embryo, automatic-
ally reducing the choice to patients, in that if they don’t get preg-
nant, their only choice of treatment then is another fresh cycle.
And if you feel very unwell through that cycle, and you get
OHSS [ovarian hyper-stimulation syndrome], you might well feel
that you wish that that embryo had been frozen on your behalf.
The clinical and ethical issues associated with possibly avoidable cycles
of treatment are also evident in a comment from Clinician 30 (Site 2):
I think anything that has got a reasonable chance of pregnancy
ought to be kept cryopreserved. The reason is, it’s less risky for
the woman to have a treatment cycle with frozen and thawed
embryos than to go through ovarian stimulation again and egg col-
lection again and put herself at risk. So, yes, you know, in terms of,
you know, do no harm and do good. It fits in with both really . . .
Significantly then, one impact of not freezing a remaining single good-
quality embryo, should the fresh cycle fail, is that the woman will
have to undergo another fresh cycle in order to try to become pregnant,
although there is always the risk, of course, that a single frozen embryo
will not survive the thawing process (to recap, a risk of about 30% for a
non-blastocyst embryo). Alternatively, even if a given cycle does give rise
to a live birth, should the couple seek a further child and if a single good-
quality embryo had not been frozen from the first cycle, there would be
no frozen embryo to try to thaw and transfer, so that a further stimula-
tion cycle would be the only option. Another highly important reason to
give couples choice about freezing even one reasonable-quality embryo
is that nothing can be presumed about the way a subsequent cycle will
go. Stem-cell Scientist 19 (Site 2) observed: ‘[G]oing through another
cycle of ovarian stimulation, it might not happen that good again or it
might not happen at all . . . ’.
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Participants’ use of phrases such as ‘because they’re theirs’ (Site 2),
‘it’s patient choice at the end of the day’, or ‘it’s their choice’ (Site 3)
or ‘it’s up to them’ (Site 1) appear to reflect awareness, not just of the
biological connection between the embryo and either one or both
parents (except where an embryo is formed entirely from donor
gametes), but also some sense that patient choice as to freezing would
be supported by the law. Is this so?
III. PATIENT CHOICE, FREEZING AND THE LAW
The legal position is not in fact clear-cut and requires some interpret-
ation. On the question of storage, section 8(2) of the HFE Act 1990
(as amended) provides:
An embryo the creation of which was brought about in vitro must
not be kept in storage unless there is an effective consent, by each
relevant person in relation to the embryo, to the storage of the
embryo and the embryo is stored in accordance with those
consents.
The Act does not stipulate that a person can require that their embryos
are stored. Indeed, as a matter of common law, a person cannot require
treatment, including assisted reproduction treatment, where a clinician
considers that treatment is against his or her clinical interests.31
However, if the remaining good- or reasonable-quality embryos left
after embryo transfer are not stored, then, unless there is consent to
another purpose—including donation to research—that embryo must
be allowed to perish.32 On the question of allowing an embryo to
perish, section 17(1) of the amended 1990 Act states that ‘[i]t shall be
31 This was a central point in the Court of Appeal decision in Re J (A Minor)
(Child in Care: Medical Treatment), [1993] Fam 15 (which concerned poten-
tial non-treatment of a severely brain-damaged child). Lord Donaldson MR
held that a court, in exercising its inherent jurisdiction, should not require a
clinician ‘to adopt a course of treatment which in the bona fide clinical judg-
ment of the practitioner concerned is contra-indicated as not being in the best
interests of the patient’ (at 26–7). The principle is reflected in jurisprudence
relating to adults in the Court of Appeal decision in Regina (Burke) v General
Medical Council (Official Solicitor and others intervening) [2006] QB 273
(which concerned proceedings brought to obtain clarification as to the cir-
cumstances in which treatment might lawfully be withdrawn from an adult
with a congenital degenerative brain condition, by means of a judicial
review of guidance issued by the General Medical Council). Lord Phillips
MR held that ‘[a]utonomy and the right of self-determination do not
entitle the patient to insist on receiving a particular medical treatment regard-
less of the nature of the treatment’ (at para 31).
32 Embryos cannot be kept longer than 14 days under the HFE Act 1990 (as
amended), s 3(4).
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the duty of the individual under whose supervision the activities
authorised by a licence are carried on . . . to secure . . . (c) that proper
arrangements are made for the keeping of . . . embryos . . . [and] for the
disposal of . . . embryos . . . that have been allowed to perish’. The ques-
tion that arises here is who in law can ‘allow’ a good- or reasonable-
quality (or at a minimum not non-viable) embryo to perish when a
couple is currently in the process of treatment. We argue that, as a
matter of interpretation, including with reference to the background
common law principle that a clinician may decline to treat where this
is considered against the interests of the person seeking treatment,
those treating a couple in an assisted reproduction clinic cannot make
the decision to ‘allow’ an embryo to perish unless they consider that
no further treatment is advisable for this couple and the couple has
not given consent for another purpose. As for other purposes, there
can only be consent to research, under the Code’s interpretation of
the Act, where an embryo is ‘not required for treatment’.33 We argue
here that any good- or reasonable-quality embryo of a couple seeking
treatment, who would not of course know the result of their current
cycle at the point of the donation of a fresh embryo to research, could
not be such an embryo unless the couple has agreed not to freeze it.
So, while the legal position is explicitly concerned with the use to
which embryos are put, implicit in this must be a certain degree of
control regarding which embryos can be used in the treatment of the
couple: arguably, it cannot be the case that a couple can be denied the
use, especially of good quality but also of other viable embryos in treat-
ment either in a fresh (subject to policy guidance as to the number that
may be transferred in any given case) or a subsequent frozen cycle,
unless those treating a woman consider for clinical reasons that
further treatment at any stage is inadvisable. Sometimes, cycles are
abandoned because of ovarian hyper-stimulation syndrome (OHSS).
However, even in these circumstances, other things being equal, it will
be possible to freeze any embryos created for future possible use
rather than continue the current fresh cycle.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This part of our article has analysed data from three UK IVF sites
involved in the provision of embryos to research, including stem-cell re-
search, in order to show the delicate and sometimes contingent nature of
the decision that an embryo is ‘spare’ and to consider aspects of the re-
lationship between professional and patient input into this decision.
33 HFEA, above, n 6.
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Once the decision has been made that an embryo is ‘unsuitable for
treatment’, therefore ‘spare’, the only decision remaining is whether it
should be discarded or donated to research or training (where suitable
for the latter purposes). The question of consent to the use of
embryos in any given research project, including stem-cell research,
has its own set of ethical and legal issues pertaining to the purposes
of the research. However, our focus here has been on the way in
which an embryo reaches the point when it might pass from the treat-
ment to the research context. The defining moment is when the decision
is made that an embryo is ‘unsuitable for treatment’, or ‘not required for
treatment’ (under the HFEA Code) and so ‘spare’.34 As noted, once an
embryo has passed from the clinic to the research laboratory on this
basis, it will no longer be available for a couple’s use in treatment. In
effect, this means that at the point when it is decided that an embryo
is ‘not required for treatment’, a couple will be consenting to that
embryo’s disuse in treatment. Most significantly, then, to consent to
an embryo being ‘spare’ is to consent to its disuse in treatment.
Subject to a couple’s consent ‘in principle’ to donation to research
and to the specific terms of any given research project, this will be
closely followed by consent to donation to research.
In this light, patient input into the decision that an embryo is ‘spare’
now requires analysis with reference to the key elements of the law of
consent, namely information as to nature and purpose, voluntariness
and capacity. We engage in this in Part 2 below, referring also to ele-
ments of the wider legal framework and relevant codes of practice.
Overall, our aim is to show that when fresh, rather than frozen
embryos are ‘let go’ as spare and subsequently donated for research
(which may particularly occur with minimum-number freezing policies
but also in other ways), in some circumstances the initial consent to an
embryo’s disuse in treatment—to its ‘spareness’—could be of uncertain
quality (in the sense that there is a risk that a couple might have decided
differently), or could in fact be invalid. While these latter occasions are
likely to be rare, more generally, our analysis will highlight the need to
attend to ways of enhancing the quality of the process of consent to an
embryo’s disuse in treatment and, subsequently, to its donation to re-
search. Further, when fresh embryos pass from the clinic to the research
laboratory (rather than being frozen for possible subsequent use in treat-
ment) there is the potential, on occasion, for women to have to undergo
what should have been avoidable additional fresh cycles of IVF and so
for their consent to these to be compromised. Accordingly, there may
34 HFEA, above, n 6.
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be effects on the reproductive treatment options of couples seeking the
birth of children through assisted reproduction treatment.
PART 2: HOW CAN WE ENHANCE THE QUALITY
AND PROTECT THE VALIDITY OF CONSENT?
I. INTRODUCTION
The donation of ‘spare’ human embryos to research, including stem-cell
research, requires the consent of the donating couple.35 In Part 1 above,
we drew attention to the delicate and sometimes contingent nature of
the decision that an embryo created for treatment purposes is ‘spare’
and the relationship between professional and patient input into this.
We concluded that consent to the donation of such an embryo to re-
search entails, first, consent to the disuse of that embryo in treatment
on the basis that it is ‘spare’. This is a stage in the process of the donation
of a ‘spare’ embryo to research that is not directly covered by the HFE
Act 1990, as amended by the HFE Act 2008, or the HFEA’s Code of
Practice: whilst the provisions of the HFE Act 1990 (as amended)
cover consent to the use of an embryo in treatment or research, they
do not deal explicitly with the significant ‘flipside’, namely consent to
its disuse in treatment (rather than withdrawal of consent for any
purpose per se); and the HFEA Code assumes a straightforward
notion of an embryo that is ‘not required for treatment’.36 Having iden-
tified this important initial stage in the process of consent to the dona-
tion of a ‘spare’ embryo to research in conclusion to Part 1, in Part 2 we
now analyse the idea of consent to an embryo’s disuse in treatment on
the basis that it is ‘spare’ with reference to the legal elements of
consent, namely information as to nature and purpose, capacity and
voluntariness.
We argue that there are in fact three related consent processes in play,
of which the principal one concerns consent to an embryo’s disuse in
treatment. If the quality of this first consent is compromised, in turn
this will impact on the quality of the consent to the donation of that
‘spare’ embryo to research, followed by the quality of consent
to future cycles of assisted reproduction treatment where these are
needed as a result of a donation decision. Our aim is to identify possible,
though hopefully rare, legal flaws in the process of consent to the dona-
tion of ‘spare’ embryos to research and, more generally, to make a
35 The relevant provisions of the HFE Act 1990, as amended by the HFE Act
2008, above, n 1, were introduced in Part 1 and will be discussed further here.
36 HFEA, above, n 6, para 22.7(h), our emphasis. The same wording was used
in the 7th edition (2007) para G.5.13.1(b); the 6th edition (2003) used the
phrase ‘surplus to treatment’, para 5.8(ii).
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recommendation that should enhance the quality of that consent. Apart
from being important in its own right, this would reduce the risk of po-
tentially avoidable fresh treatment cycles for women trying to conceive a
child and protect, as much as possible, the reproductive treatment
options of couples needing assisted reproduction treatment. Our discus-
sion has a particular bearing on the question of whether and if so to
what extent it should be permissible to request fresh, rather than
frozen embryos (that are coming to the end of their statutory storage
term)37 for research. In this sense, it is particularly relevant to the dona-
tion of embryos to stem-cell research, since (as noted in Part 1) there is a
debate as to whether fresh embryos are the most useful for this kind of
research.38
We outlined our qualitative research into three UK IVF sites involved
in the provision of embryos to research, including stem-cell research, in
Part 1. We make further reference to some of this data in Part 2, as well
as to empirical research conducted by others into practices that, in our
view, particularly highlight the need to attend to the process of
consent to an embryo’s disuse in treatment.
In Section II, we analyse the legal elements of this consent with refer-
ence to the common law, the HFE Act 1990 (as amended) and relevant
ethical guidance, notably in the HFEA’s Code and the Medical Research
Council (MRC) Steering Committee’s Code of Practice for the Use of
Human Stem Cell Lines.39 The central connecting thread is the impact
that the timing of the request for the donation of ‘spare’ embryos to re-
search may have on the satisfaction of the elements of consent. In effect,
this is an issue relating to whether fresh rather than frozen embryos may
be sought, and may then pass, from the clinic to the research laboratory.
In Section III, we argue for our key recommendation which concerns
whether, and if so when, it should be permissible to request fresh
embryos for research.
II. CONSENT TO AN EMBRYO’S DISUSE IN TREATMENT
A. The HFE Act 1990 as amended by the HFE Act 2008
and the Legal Elements of Consent
The consents involved in assisted reproduction treatment are governed
by a mixture of common law and statute under the HFE Act 1990 (as
amended). When a couple seeks treatment, the woman is the patient
(she will be subject to a certain drug regime and egg retrieval
37 As noted earlier, this is now 10 years in the UK under the HFE Act 1990
(as amended), above, n 1, s 14(4).
38 Above, n 3.
39 MRC Steering Committee, above, n 6.
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procedures) and she must consent to that treatment, the validity of
which is assessed by the common law requirements of capacity, infor-
mation as to nature and purpose and voluntariness.40 We outlined the
statutory provisions on consent in Part 1, noting that these require a
couple’s consent in writing for any of the stipulated purposes and that
compliance with these is a condition of a clinic’s licence under section
12(1) of the amended 1990 Act.41 We argued above, on the basis of the
consent and other provisions of the Act and with reference also to the
common law, that implicit in this legal requirement of consent to the
use of embryos in treatment must be a certain degree of control regarding
which embryos can be used in treatment, including by freezing. This is
because it cannot be the case that a couple can be denied the use especially
of good-quality embryos, but also of any viable embryo, either in a fresh
cycle (subject to HFEA guidance as to the number that may be transferred
in any given case) or a subsequent frozen one, unless a clinician considers
that further treatment at any stage is inadvisable.42 We further develop
this analysis here.
1. Capacity
All adults (those over 16) are presumed competent to consent to treat-
ment and research in English law. Under section 2 of the Mental Cap-
acity Act 2005 (the MCA 2005), a patient lacks capacity if s/he is
‘unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter
because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of,
the mind or brain’. Section 3 stipulates that this will occur where a
person is ‘unable – (a) to understand the information relevant to the de-
cision, (b) to retain that information, (c) to use or weigh that informa-
tion as part of the process of making the decision, or (d) to
communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign language or
any other means)’.
The issue of capacity may be relevant to the timing of consent to an
embryo’s disuse in treatment, coupled with its availability for research,
in that the decision-making capacity of some women at an advanced
stage of ovarian stimulation may be impaired. However, in the Court
of Appeal in Re M.B. (Adult: Medical Treatment), Lady Justice Butler-
Sloss stressed that although temporary factors such as confusion, shock,
fatigue, pain, or drugs may completely capacity, others must be satisfied
40 Regarding each of these elements, see, respectively, Re M.B. [1997] 8 Med
LR 217, Chatterton v Gerson [1981] 1 All ER 257, Re T (Adult: Refusal
of Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649.
41 See also HFEA, above, n 6, Licence conditions T57, R18.
42 Re J (A Minor) (Child in Care: Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam 15; Regina
(Burke) v General Medical Council (Official Solicitor and others interven-
ing), above, n 31.
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that these factors are so powerful that the ability to decide is not present
(that is, that capacity is truly eroded).43 Despite this caveat, it may be
with a view to the issue of capacity (and also perhaps to that of volun-
tariness, introduced below) that the MRC Steering Committee’s Code
recommends that ‘[d]onors should be approached as early as possible,
usually before ovary stimulation, to allow sufficient time to think
issues over’.44 The possibility that decision-making capacity could be
affected, and conceivably negated, may be evident in comments from
Nurse 1 (Site 3) with regard to seeking consent during treatment:
The patient’s got to make their decision in a cold situation and
not . . . with all the emotions going round their heads when
they’re at egg collection and they’re full of hormones and they’re
full of expectations and anticipation and they’ve got a vision of
this baby that’s coming . . . that’s not a time for decision making.
The negation of a woman’s capacity as the result of her drug stimula-
tion regime is clearly possible, with the result that her part of the consent
to an embryo being ‘spare’, and so removed from the treatment context
and donated to research at this time, could be invalid. However, such a
scenario will probably be rare and what may be more likely is that
decision-making capacity could be affected rather than actually
negated. For instance, as the above quote illustrates, it may be that a
woman finds it very difficult to think about a request related to research
at a time when her focus, as a patient, is on treatment. In this light, since
there is always a risk of capacity being affected and, more remotely, of
an actual negation of capacity, we argue that seeking consent to the do-
nation of ‘spare’ embryos to research during a treatment cycle is in-
appropriate, subject to some exceptions that we detail later. The
remainder of our analysis concentrates on the legal elements of informa-
tion and voluntariness. After introducing these, we subsequently analyse
their place in the process of consent to an embryo’s disuse in treatment.
2. Information
To be informed about treatment and research sufficient for the legal
notion of consent, a patient must be informed of its nature and
purpose.45 Generally speaking, consent to research could entail
43 Re M.B. above, n 40, 224.
44 MRC Steering Committee, above, n 6, para 9.1.
45 Above, n 40. There is no English case law that can be cited for the require-
ments of a valid consent to research. However, it is commonly understood
that the requirements of capacity, information, and voluntariness are also
relevant to the validity of consent to research. For a recent statement of
this, see eg Nuffield Council on Bioethics: Human Bodies: Donation for
Medicine and Research (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, London 2011),
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consent to taking a trial drug or the donation of bodily tissue (to which
the Human Tissue Act 2004 would be relevant). Here, we are concerned
with the donation of an entity (an embryo), created for the purpose of
assisted reproduction treatment, to research. There is therefore a physic-
al (in the form of the embryo) and conceptual link (by means of the pro-
cesses of consent involved) between the treatment and research domains.
In this light, we argue that there are three related consent processes at
stake, of which the principal one concerns consent to an embryo’s
disuse in treatment on the basis that it is ‘spare’. The second concerns
consent to the donation of that ‘spare’ embryo to research and the
third may concern consent to one or more additional fresh cycles of
treatment. The reason for the third aspect is that assisted reproduction
very often involves more than one round of ovarian stimulation
(where a first round is unsuccessful) and will almost always do so if
more than one child is sought.46 In any event, at the point when a
fresh embryo may be released for research, the outcome of the current
cycle will not yet be known, so that the possibility of future treatment
being needed is highly relevant. For these reasons, the ‘treatment’ in
question is best viewed as a ‘treatment process’ that may well entail
more than one cycle of ovarian stimulation. We are concerned, then,
with the information of relevance to that treatment process as a whole.
Turning specifically to the research context, and moving beyond the
baseline of the legal requirements for consent to aspects of the relevant
ethical codes, the Declaration of Helsinki, for instance, refers to consent
that is ‘adequately informed’ as to a number of factors, including the
‘potential risks of the study’.47 The General Medical Council advises,
in part: ‘You must give people the information they want or need in
order to decide whether to take part in research . . . You must not
make assumptions about the information a person might want or
need, or their knowledge and understanding of the proposed research
project’;48 and that ‘[i]f you are involved in designing, organising or car-
rying out research, you must . . . put the protection of the participants’
interests first’.49 Ethically speaking, these statements indicate the par-
ticular importance of information in the research context, though
English case law has not dealt explicitly with consent to research.
Moving directly now to the donation of embryos to research, includ-
ing stem-cell research, the HFE Act 1990 (as amended) requires that
para 2.7. See further below regarding the ethical requirements for consent to
research.
46 The caveat ‘almost’ allows for the case of a twin birth.
47 Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association, 1964, and amended by
the 59th WMA General Assembly, Seoul, October 2008) para 24.
48 GMC, Consent to Research (2010) para 4, our emphasis.
49 GMC, Good Medical Practice (2006) para 71.
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‘[b]efore a person gives consent . . . (a) he must be given a suitable oppor-
tunity to receive proper counselling about the implications of taking the
proposed steps, and (b) he must be provided with such relevant informa-
tion as is proper’.50 Interpreting this requirement, the HFEA Code
advises, in part, that ‘before a person consents to donating embryos
. . . for research . . . they should be given: (a) enough information to
understand the nature, purpose and implications of their donation’.51
The HFEA Code lists the information that potential donors should
receive prior to giving consent.52 There is an additional list where stem-
cell donation is concerned.53 For research in general, information should
be given about, for example: ‘(a) the specific research project and its
aims . . . (c) whether the embryos will be reversibly or irreversibly anon-
ymised, and the implications of this’.54 Whilst important in their own
right, these points do not concern us here. We are, however, concerned
with two crucial points of general relevance to donation to research, in-
cluding stem-cell research:
(f ) that donating gametes or embryos to research in the course of
treatment services will not affect the patient’s treatment in any
way . . . (h) that only fresh or frozen gametes and embryos not
required for treatment can be used for research.55
We drew attention to the phrase ‘not required for treatment’ in Part 1,
highlighting that the Code makes no mention of the decision-making
process by which an embryo comes to be labelled as such, and therefore
‘spare’, and so identifying the need to analyse the attendant process of
consent, which we undertake here.56 Here, we will also consider
whether there is scope for paragraph (f ) to be breached when fresh
embryos are donated to research, in the sense that the decision to
donate could on some occasions affect a woman’s treatment, under-
stood as the ‘treatment process’.
50 HFE Act 1990 (as amended), above, n 1, Sched 3, para 3(1).
51 HFEA, above, n 6, ‘Interpretation of Mandatory Requirements’, Box 22B.
52 Ibid, para 22.7.
53 Ibid, Licence condition R20.
54 Ibid, para 22.7.
55 Ibid, our emphases. The 7th edition, above, n 6, stated ‘that research will not
affect the treatment cycle; and . . . where gametes or embryos are being
donated to research in the course of treatment services, that this will not com-
promise the treatment cycle’, para G.5.13.1(c), (d); the same wording is used
in the 6th edition, above, n 6, para 5.8 (iii), (iv).
56 In the form for donation to stem-cell research, ‘Consent Form: Patient
Consent to Research: Derivation of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Lines’,
the phrase ‘embryos that are surplus/unsuitable for treatment’ is also used.
S Franklin, C Hunt, G Cornwell, V Peddie, and others, ‘hESSCO: Develop-
ment of Good Practice Models for hES Cell Derivation’, (2008) 3(1) Regen
Med 105–16, 114.
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In the light of the above, if fresh embryos were to be sought for re-
search, what information should patients be given in addition to the
points in the relevant codes? Since we are concerned, first, with
consent to the disuse of an embryo in treatment, part of this question
concerns what a patient must be informed of in order to consent to
that disuse. Accordingly, we argue that patients would have to be
informed: that the advice is that a given embryo is ‘unsuitable for treat-
ment’ or ‘not required for treatment’ (the phrase in the HFEA Code) and
the reasons for this, including on the grounds of a clinic’s freezing policy
(discussed below); that they nevertheless have the option to freeze viable
non-transferred embryos if they wish (assuming that there are no clinical
contraindications regarding further treatment, which is unlikely in rela-
tion to a frozen-replacement cycle); that occasionally viable embryos
judged to be of poor quality do in fact have good pregnancy potential;
and that where no viable embryos are frozen from an initial cycle any
further treatment will necessarily entail a further fresh cycle rather
than a frozen-replacement one, so that donation will affect the treatment
process as a whole. When informed of this last point, it seems unlikely
that a couple would consent to the donation of fresh viable embryos to
research, a crucial point to which we shall return, rather than request
that those embryos be frozen (subject to any financial obstacles or
other concerns). This is because, where they are able to freeze
embryos, should they need further treatment, they would then have
the option either of a frozen replacement cycle or a further fresh one (de-
pending on their appraisal of information regarding thawing, a clinic’s
success with frozen-replacement cycles, ‘banking’, and respective
costs). We will add some important elements to this ‘information list’
as our analysis unfolds.
3. Voluntariness
Consent to treatment or research is only valid if voluntary.57 The little
English case law on point concerns a patient’s will being overborne in
some way. In the leading case of Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment),
the Court of Appeal explored the notion of undue influence and the
way it might negate voluntariness, analysing the effect of influence
with reference to the strength of will of the patient (for instance, if
tired or in pain s/he may be less able to resist), the relationship
between the persuader and the patient and the types of arguments
used.58 It is not easy to prove that voluntariness is negated in the treat-
ment context, as a case from the assisted reproduction context shows.
57 Above, n 40.
58 Re T, above, n 40.
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In U v Centre for Reproductive Medicine,59 a husband had signed the
clinic’s consent form on storage and disposal of sperm which advised
that the clinic did not agree with posthumous use of sperm but that if
necessary ‘[p]ossible transfer’ to another clinic could be discussed. He
also signed an HFEA form agreeing, amongst other things, that his
sperm could be used posthumously. The next day his sperm was surgi-
cally extracted (due to a prior vasectomy) and frozen. Some weeks later,
the couple attended the clinic to discuss further his wife’s treatment,
which was about to start. At that meeting, he was suddenly and unex-
pectedly asked to withdraw his consent to posthumous use by a nurse
on the grounds of the clinic’s policy, which he then did. A few days
later, his wife’s treatment began. The first cycle was unsuccessful and
they were due to try again but the husband died. The clinic sought
advice as to the legal position and the wife argued that her husband’s
withdrawal of consent to posthumous use resulted from undue influ-
ence. In the Family Division, Lady Justice Butler-Sloss found that the
nurse had not made her request ‘at all sensitively’; that she ‘gave to
the wife the impression that there would be at least a pause in the treat-
ment cycle with the possibility that it might be interrupted or even
brought to a halt’ if her husband did not change his mind; and that
‘[h]e succumbed to the firmly expressed request of Miss Hinks [the
nurse] and under some pressure’, likely not thinking this part of the
form would ever be relevant.60 However, despite the ‘considerable’61
pressure, she held that ‘it is difficult to say that an able, intelligent, edu-
cated man of 47, with a responsible job and in good health, could have
his will overborne so that the act of altering the form and initialling the
alterations was done in circumstances in which Mr U no longer thought
and decided for himself’.62 In short, giving attention to Mr U’s charac-
teristics generally, she held that the pressure was not enough to consti-
tute undue influence, for which more had to be shown. The question,
as she put it, was whether he changed his mind ‘under compulsion’.63
However, she also found the case was ‘finely balanced’ and so gave
leave to appeal.64 The Court of Appeal agreed with her decision.
Lady Justice Hale (as she then was) observed:
The test these days, [counsel for Mrs U] says, is not whether Mr U’s
will was overborne but whether he had a real choice on that day to
refuse to alter the form. In the end, he argues, it comes down to
59 [2002] EWCA Civ 565.
60 [2002] EWHC 36 (Fam), para 22.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid, para 28.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid, para 2.
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what Mr U really wanted . . . That is not, however, the question in
this case. The question is whether the Centre has an effective
consent for the continued storage and later use of these sperm.
Without such consent it is unlawful for them to continue to keep
it. On the face of it the Centre does not have such consent in this
case. There could scarcely be a more obvious way of withdrawing
consent than changing the very document upon which it is recorded
in the presence of a representative of the Centre and authenticating
it for her.65
With respect, it is not clear that there is sufficient attention here to the
quality of the decision Mr U made to change his mind, especially since
she observed earlier that ‘[t]hey had already committed themselves,
mentally, emotionally and financially, to the course of treatment. The
husband had already undergone his part in it. The wife was about to
begin hers. This was a considerable ordeal and they were both very vul-
nerable’.66 The decision is supported by Andrew Grubb, who cites Lady
Justice Hale’s observation that ‘[s]adly, it is only with the benefit of
hindsight that he might have wished to do otherwise’.67 By contrast, it
is criticised by Shaun Pattinson, who argues that the husband’s position
and characteristics were ‘likely to be weakened by the degree of trust
typically vested in medical opinion and the emotional vulnerability of
most patients’; and that, since Mr U was in a position where the costs
of not changing his official statement of views appeared high and the
consequences very remote, ‘even a small amount of pressure [would
have been] sufficient to overbear [his] will’.68 The Court of Appeal
also emphasised that a court should be slow to find undue influence
where that would provide a clinic with a consent that it would not other-
wise have.69 In fact, we are likewise concerned with the idea of a clinic
being provided with a consent that it would not otherwise have, more-
over a consent to an embryo created for treatment purposes being ‘spare’
and available for research, and this is a reason for particular attention to
the quality of the consent process. Overall, the U case raises the question
of whether the idea of ‘compulsion’, as understood by these judges, is
sufficiently sensitive to the circumstances of this kind of case.
65 Above, n 59, paras 22 and 23.
66 Ibid, para 21.
67 A Grubb, ‘Infertility Treatment: Posthumous use of Sperm and Withdrawal
of Consent’ (2002) 10(3) Med L Rev 326–7, 327, citing above, n 59,
para 28.
68 S Pattinson, ‘Undue Influence in the Context of Medical Treatment’ (2002)
5(4) Med L Int 305–17, 309, 310.
69 Above, n 59, paras 28 and 26, respectively.
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Voluntariness may in fact also be affected by factors beyond those
such as ‘undue influence’. For example, when the President’s Commis-
sion looked at this issue, it emphasised not just that treatment should
not be coerced, but also that manipulation of information—through
misrepresentation, fraud, or distortion—may affect voluntariness.70
Whilst the former examples imply intention, the latter may occur unin-
tentionally. We aim to show that because of the timing of the consent
process when fresh embryos are sought for research, unintentional
flaws in information may also affect voluntariness in various ways.
Codes governing research also emphasise the need for a willing par-
ticipant. Standard worries about voluntariness in this context concern
the vulnerability of patients and, potentially, their sense of gratitude
to their clinicians.71 The Declaration of Helsinki contains a warning
about patients’ dependency.72 Here, we note such concerns with specific
reference to the situation of IVF couples, a point to which the law should
also be sensitive.
B. Information, Voluntariness, and the Timing of Consent
to an Embryo’s Disuse in Treatment
In this section, we analyse possible flaws in the principal consent process
with which we are concerned, that is, consent to the disuse of an embryo
in current treatment on the basis that it is ‘spare’. We analyse the pos-
sible impact of these flaws on the two other consent processes, namely
consent to the donation of that ‘spare’ embryo to research and
consent to future cycles of treatment, in Section C below.
1. Requests for Donation to Research before or during Treatment
When interpreting the HFE Act 1990 (as amended), the HFEA Code
provides that:
The centre should give anyone . . . considering donation . . . enough
time to reflect on their decisions before obtaining their consent.
The centre should give them an opportunity to ask questions and
receive further information, advice and guidance . . . If the possibil-
ity of donating . . . embryos . . . for research . . . arises during the
course of treatment, the centre should allow potential donors
70 President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Making Healthcare Decisions: The
Ethical and Legal Implications of Informed Consent in the Patient-
Practitioner Relationship, Volume 1: Report (Washington, US Government
Printing Office 1982) 66–8.
71 E Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases and Materials (2nd edn, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford 2009) 490.
72 Above, n 47, para 26.
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enough time to consider the implications and to receive counselling
before giving consent.73
The HFEA Code clearly considers that donating embryos to research
may arise ‘during the course of treatment’ and cautions about the
need for sufficient time for reflection on the part of donors in these cir-
cumstances, which it appears to consider to be achievable. However, as
the following discussion shows, seeking consent during treatment has
the potential to impact negatively on the consent elements of informa-
tion and voluntariness. Although the provision in the MRC Steering
Committee’s Code that ‘[d]onors should be approached as early as pos-
sible, usually before ovary stimulation, to allow sufficient time to think
issues over’ (cited above) is commendable, our discussion shows that
seeking consent before treatment is also problematic.
At the clinics we visited it was nurses, clinicians, or stem-cell coordi-
nators who sought ‘in principle’ consent before treatment began, using a
standard HFEA form. Willing couples would then be approached later
in an additional process of consent to a specific research project. The
key question, of relevance to the debate about the donation of fresh
embryos to research, is how much later a second consent—one that
removes an embryo from possible therapeutic use—should take place.
At Site 3, Embryologist 2 advised that the policy was to raise the topic
of donation ‘as early as possible so that the patients have time to think
about possible research and ask questions’. However, Embryologist 7
observed: ‘Patients tend to get confused. So it’s making sure that you
don’t have information overload and . . . make them worry or unduly
stressed.’ Relevant to this is the question of the real focus of couples’ at-
tention at this time. Nurse 21 (Site 2) observed that at most one in ten
couples had talked to each other about freezing and research when they
‘come back’, saying:74 ‘They’re not really interested. They are just
focused on coming through for treatment, getting a date, starting . . .
they will do whatever you say.’ This was supported by Nurse 3 from
that clinic.
In short, one highly significant worry about any consent pre-treatment
is that patients have to deal with a great deal of information at this time
that is relevant to their treatment, the issue on which they are naturally
focused. For this reason, the information element of any consent to an
embryo’s disuse in treatment and so to its donation to research may
be compromised in a way that we summarise shortly.
We now turn to the idea of consent to donation during treatment, in-
cluding a ‘final’ consent to the donation of fresh embryos to research. Of
73 HFEA, above, n 6, paras 5.6 and 5.7.
74 Our emphasis.
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relevance to voluntariness may be Nurse 1’s comments (above, Site 3)
relating to ‘emotions going round their heads when they’re at egg collec-
tion and they’re full of hormones’, given that the drug regime could in
some circumstances negatively impact on the strength of a woman’s
will and given the relationship of the person requesting consent (profes-
sional, even if from the research laboratory rather than the clinic) to the
patient. Indeed, Counsellor 6 (Site 3) was concerned that patients might
want to be thought of as ‘good patients’, a point of general relevance
that we identified earlier, observing that ‘taking consents is linked in
to being a good patient and doing what you think the clinic maybe
wants you to do’. A potential problem with any final consent before
egg collection is brought out by Embryologist 20 (Site 2), who noted
that ‘once they form embryos . . . the patients do form a bond with
those embryos, much more so than they would with just eggs’. The
point here, which relates first to the information element of consent, is
that a couple may feel differently when embryos, rather than eggs and
sperm, actually exist and arguably this is an additional point of which
they should be advised. In line with this approach, Embryologist 5
(Site 3) spoke of ‘giv[ing] them the information on the day of egg collec-
tion, so the patients have still got a few days to think about things and
change their minds’, with final consent being sought on the day of
embryo transfer. However, we question whether patients are able to
think sufficiently clearly at either of these critical times about the dona-
tion to research of what is, for them, an important finite resource.
Rather, as Embryologist 7 (Site 3) reminds us: ‘[A]ctually, you know,
patients are just focused on their treatment. They’re here to get pregnant
and that’s the priority and it should be the clinic’s priority’.75 The idea
of a final consent at embryo transfer was in fact rejected by Counsellor
28 (Site 2) who observed: ‘[I]t would be a dilemma for couples, who are
in a very emotionally charged situation to make a decision then . . . [The
embryos are] . . . very special, and I think that is a very hard and import-
ant decision to make before they just let them go’.76
In short, there is the potential for either or both of the information and
voluntariness elements of consent to be affected when consent to the do-
nation of ‘spare’ embryos to research is sought either before or during
treatment, as will necessarily be the case when fresh embryos are
sought for research. The effect could constitute a reduction in the
quality of consent (in the sense that there is a risk that a couple might
have decided differently) or an actual negation of the validity of
consent. Whilst the common law doctrine of consent requires information
75 Our emphasis.
76 Our emphasis.
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to be given as to nature and purpose, it is in fact silent on the question of a
patient’s actual understanding. However, from a statutory viewpoint, the
HFEA Code, interpreting the amended 1990 Act, stipulates:
The centre should ensure that anyone giving consent declares that:
(a) they were given enough information to enable them to under-
stand the nature, purpose and implications of the . . . donation (b)
they were given a suitable opportunity to receive proper counselling
about the implications . . . (d) the information they have given in
writing is correct and complete.77
In other words, the HFE Act is interpreted by the HFEA as requiring a
‘check’ on the information given and the understanding that followed it.
Overall, the possible hazards of consent during treatment are well
captured by Clinician 30 (Site 2):78 ‘I think the consenting issue . . . is
a major issue in terms of getting embryos for research . . . getting it
right . . . [I]f you are unscrupulous, you can just get them to sign . . .
after a minimal amount of information and . . . they will sign it
without having understood the full implications of it.’ In sum, where
information is given in circumstances such as those described above—
when couples are in fact focused on their treatment—the quality of
consent to research may be foreseeably compromised and there could
be grounds, on occasion, to question the validity of consent. Moreover,
the risks of such effects on consent are unnecessarily run, since frozen
embryos that are no longer wanted for treatment and, preferably, are
coming to the end of their statutory storage term could be sought
instead, as discussed further in Section III. (Of course, couples can
choose a storage term of less than the statutory maximum, and can
then elect to extend the term if they wish.)
In the light of the above discussion, we draw attention to a study
(published in 2004 and relating to research conducted in 2002–2003)
about donation of embryos to research at the Newcastle Fertility
Centre. The paper is not concerned with consent in the way that we
are, but rather with examining the donation rates of fresh embryos
with a view to increasing these.79 At the time of the study, the clinic
had a freezing policy that required a minimum of four ‘spare’
embryos, although if these criteria were not met, requests for freezing
77 HFEA, above, n 6, para 5.9. This further develops the requirements in ‘Inter-
pretation of Mandatory Requirements’, Box 22B, above, in the quoted text
preceding n 51, and in paras 5.6 and 5.7, above in the quoted text preceding
n 73.
78 Our emphasis.
79 M Choudhary and others, ‘Demographic, Medical and Treatment Character-
istics Associated with Couples’ Decisions to Donate Fresh Spare Embryos for
Research’ (2004) 19/9 Human Reproduction 2091–6.
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were ‘considered’.80 Couples received information, the HFEA leaflet on
embryo donation for research and a consent form (explaining the
research study, which was either stem-cell or preimplantation
genetic diagnosis (‘PGD’) research81) two days before egg collection.
The authors state: ‘Giving the research information 2 days prior to
oocyte retrieval allowed time to ensure that both partners had thorough-
ly considered the proposed research study and its implications before
consenting for research.’82 In the light of comments made by many of
the interviewees cited above and of our discussion particularly of infor-
mation and voluntariness, we respectfully doubt that this would have
been the case. The embryo donation rate, the issue of central concern
to the authors, was 54.3%, which the authors note is ‘higher than
(10-21%) in most of the other reported studies’.83 (Recall here that in
Part 1 we observed that a participant from Site 2 told us that 98% of
couples elect to freeze embryos when given the choice, although at that
site the actual number of couples freezing was about 70–75%.) Of
those who consented to donation at the Newcastle clinic, 94% did so
on the day of egg collection and 6% on the day of embryo transfer.84 Strik-
ingly, none of the couples who consented asked any questions relating to
stem-cell research,85 which we suggest may be best explained by couples’
focus on treatment at this time. Importantly, the study found that ‘the
number of follicles and embryos and previous failed fertilisation has a
significant influence on a couple’s decision to donate the spare embryos
for research’.86 In our view, this is unsurprising since these would be the
key factors affecting a couple’s prospects of success from IVF.
On the goals of research, the authors note that ‘[f ]or isolation of an
ES cell line from the inner cell mass, it is essential that these suboptimal
surplus embryos develop to blastocyst stage’ and further that a
then-recent study suggested that frozen embryos were less likely to do
this.87 Most significantly, of the ‘suboptimal surplus’ embryos
donated to research in this study, 34% did indeed develop into blasto-
cysts. From the perspective of the donors, this is a highly significant
80 Ibid, 2092.
81 PGD involves removing a single cell from a day 3 embryo and testing it for a
serious genetic condition. ‘Affected embryos’ are those that have tested posi-
tive for a serious genetic condition. For further discussion, see eg R Scott and
others, ‘The Appropriate Extent of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis:
Health Professionals’ Views on the Requirement for a ‘Significant Risk of a
Serious Genetic Condition’’ (2007) 15(3) Med L Rev 320.
82 Choudhary and others, above, n 79, 2094, our emphasis.





Med. L. Rev. Donation of embryos to research 287
concern and it brings us to a crucial point that may be little known
outside the clinic and the research laboratory, which is that a good re-
search embryo might also be a good treatment embryo. In other
words, 34% of the ‘suboptimal’ embryos in fact had good potential
to result in a live birth.88 For this reason, the fact that they were ‘not
required for treatment’—a categorisation they must have been implicitly
given in order to comply with the HFEA Code’s requirement that only
such embryos can be used for research—can only be explained by the
operation of the freezing policy, a point to which we return in the
next section.
In our view, the critical point that an embryo that is good for research
(especially stem-cell research since this requires, first, the formation of a
blastocyst) might also be good for treatment is an additional highly im-
portant point about which a donor of a fresh embryo should be
informed. Indeed, a number of our participants commented on the sig-
nificant implications of this for consent and freezing issues. Embryolo-
gist 34 (Site 1) observed:
[W]hen we say to patients . . . ‘Oh well if your embryos are not good
enough for your own use, then we can either, we’ll either discard
them, if they’re only worth discarding, those embryos.’ But then
you say, ‘Oh well we might use them for research,’ but then
embryos for research need to be good quality, and I think that’s
the missing link in some ways – is nobody says that . . . nobody
really sort of says about the fact that embryos for research are
good quality embryos that potentially do have that, well that
have that potential to make a pregnancy. If then, if they’re really
poor quality, then they’re not going to be of any use in research.89
S/he explains that this potential of embryos accounts for ‘why we’ve
gone over to keeping the embryos a bit longer, to give them every oppor-
tunity we can to show us that they . . . are continuing to develop and with
good quality’. Here s/he is referring to the clinic’s use of blastocyst
culture, which was not available at the time of the Newcastle study
referred to above.
Indeed, it is appropriate to acknowledge here that the use of blasto-
cysts more ubiquitously in IVF treatment has developed relatively re-
cently, concurrently with initial attempts to grow stem cells from
human embryos (first in the world in 199890 and in the UK in
88 This does not imply that a live birth would necessarily have resulted, only that
there would have been a good chance of this happening.
89 Our emphasis.
90 JA Thomson and others, ‘Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived from Human
Blastocysts’ (1998) 282 Science 1145–7.
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200391), and largely in response to a move to reduce multiple pregnan-
cies by means of SET without compromising pregnancy rates.92 Many
clinics are still wary of so doing, not only out of fear that introducing
new technology might reduce their established success rates, but
because of the additional laboratory time and techniques needed for
blastocyst culture; there are also those concerned about possible
adverse effects on the embryo of using extended culture.93 In other
words, the possible usefulness of the ‘research-allocated embryo’ in
treatment might be said to have crept up on clinics to some degree,
without any conscious thought that research consent policies also
need to change for the reasons under discussion here. With regard to
the appropriate balance between treatment and research and the possi-
bility of a fresh embryo making a good stem-cell line, strikingly Re-
search Manager 32 (Site 1) observed:
If there is a fresh embryo that . . . you could make a stem cell line
from, then you have to ask yourself why it’s not being frozen for
later years in the patient’s treatment . . . And you say, ‘Hang on a
minute, that really is, you know, that should be for the patient’s
use, not for the stem cells.’
And Embryologist 7 (Site 3) observed: ‘I’m sure there would never be a
case where, if there were suitable embryos to freeze, that, you know, they
would go to research. But I wonder in big research labs if they freeze less
because they have more embryos to research. I don’t know. That’s, it is
rather – and I hope people wouldn’t be like that.’
2. Freezing Policies and Patient Choice
We now consider the way the information and voluntariness elements of
a couple’s consent to the donation of fresh embryos to research may be
compromised, with particular reference to a clinic’s freezing policy, and
the place of patient choice in relation to that policy. Shortly we revisit,
with reference to the legal elements of consent, the policies at the clinics
we visited that we first discussed in Part 1. Before this, we introduce
further data from an empirical study conducted by others. This study,
the results of which were published by Erica Haimes and Ken Taylor,
interviewed 44 couples who had been asked to donate embryos to
91 ‘First Human Embryo Stem Cell Success’ (2003) 221 Bionews. This was at
King’s College London using ‘affected’ PGD embryos.
92 Personal communication, Professor Peter Braude, above, n 19. We discussed
SET in Part 1 above. On the use of blastocysts in treatment and SET, see eg
DK Gardner and others, ‘Blastocyst Score Affects Implantation and Preg-
nancy Outcome: Towards a Single Blastocyst Transfer’ (2000) 73/6 Fertil
Steril 1155–8.
93 Personal communication: Professor Peter Braude, ibid.
Med. L. Rev. Donation of embryos to research 289
research at another UK clinic.94 The authors state that ‘the study builds
on an earlier investigation in the same clinic which indicated broad pat-
terns of donor characteristics’.95 Their footnote reference here is to the
Newcastle study that we discussed above.
At the time of these authors’ research (in 2005–06), the (Newcastle)
clinic had a dual quantity–quality criterion, described by the research-
ers as follows:
[T]his clinic has a longstanding policy, which predates involvement
with hESC research, of caution towards freezing embryos, due to
concerns that it gives couples false hopes about future outcomes,
given the likely deterioration on thawing, and also because of the
expense of freezing. The clinic only freezes embryos if there are
four or more good quality ones left after embryo transfer . . . 96
In a further paper, they describe the policy slightly differently, referring
to ‘freezing a minimum of four top quality embryos’.97 (Of course these
were some of the concerns also expressed by those we interviewed at Site
3, which had a three-embryo freezing policy, as discussed in Part 1.) Al-
though there is no reference in their papers to patients being permitted to
override this policy, it seems unlikely that it admitted no exceptions and,
as noted above, the Choudhary and others study referred to requests for
freezing being ‘considered’. That said, the empirical evidence in the
Haimes and Taylor study suggests that many couples were in fact
unaware of any options they may have had. Indeed, the researchers
found that nearly all the couples interviewed would have preferred to
transfer two embryos and freeze the rest; further, they were not clear
about several aspects of their treatment, notably: how a judgment as to
embryo quality had been made; how a decision about what to do with
the remaining embryos had been reached; why they had not met the con-
ditions of the freezing policy; and whether the clinic’s involvement in re-
search had any bearing on the decisions made.98 At least fifteen couples
said ‘that they were not told much or anything at this stage and this had
left them puzzled’ and also that they did not know whether embryos not
‘good enough’ for clinical use were ‘good enough’ for research.99 One
94 E Haimes and K Taylor, ‘Fresh Embryo Donation for Human Embryonic
Stem Cell (hESC) Research: the Experiences and Values of IVF Couples
Asked to be Embryo Donors’ (2009) 24 Human Reproduction 2142–2150.
95 Ibid, 2142, footnote omitted, citing Choudhary and others, above, n 79.
96 Haimes and Taylor, above, n 94, 2144, our emphasis.
97 E. Haimes and K. Taylor, “The Contributions of Empirical Evidence to
Socio-Ethical Debates on Fresh Embryo Donation for Human Embryonic
Stem Cell Research”, (2009) Bioethics 334–341, 336, n. 8. Our emphasis.
98 Haimes and Taylor, above, n 94, 2144, 2147.
99 Ibid, 2144.
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couple was puzzled that after being told that the plan was to transfer two
of fourteen embryos that had been created, the response to the question
of whether there were any suitable for freezing was that there were appar-
ently none. The woman adds: ‘So I don’t know whether that was below
the four because I believe it’s got be four perfect ones, then they’ll go
ahead and freeze them. . . . So maybe there were one or two perfect
ones used for research that they couldn’t use in the freezing process.
I’ve no idea.’100 Haimes and Taylor observe here that ‘[i]t is important
to add that this person immediately said, “I understood at the time
that things would happen that way and I understood fully” . . . .
However, she is clearly indicating that there was ambiguity in what
was said or in how she understood it’.101 Although some couples were
happy with the way embryos had been selected for transfer, others ques-
tioned the decision-making process. One woman observed ‘they’ve prob-
ably thrown some good ones away, you don’t know’.102 This was a
particular worry for couples with more than two top quality embryos
left after transfer but less than four. Of those interviewed, more than
eleven couples said they had at least one top quality embryo that had
not been used in treatment or frozen.103 Haimes and Taylor strikingly
characterise the additional embryo(s) as ‘the troubling third embryo’,
in relation to which one woman observed ‘that might be my one
chance of having a baby and I’ve given it away for this research’.104
Notably, another woman said:
[T]hat possibility had not occurred to me – that you’d have a viable
embryo that they would not freeze. . . that wasn’t covered particu-
larly well and that’s the bit afterwards I said to [partner] that I
didn’t feel happy with . . . I felt differently about donating the
viable embryo . . . because the way I felt it had been worded was,
or how I understood it, was all the viable ones would be
frozen . . . The non-viable embryos that weren’t suitable for freez-
ing . . . I had no problems with, but . . . the viable embryo, yes
I did. . . . I don’t think I had really appreciated the emotional
aspect of [long pause] . . . wasting my own eggs, if you see what
I mean? That, that was a loss . . . 105
Strikingly, Haimes and Taylor found that at least nine couples ques-
tioned (albeit typically ‘hesitatingly’ or ‘apologetically’) whether
100 Ibid, 2145, our emphasis.




105 Ibid, first emphasis ours; second emphasis in original.
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treatment was of secondary importance to the clinic, compared with re-
search.106 Although interviewees had been reassured about ‘proper pro-
cedures’, they still had doubts.107 Not surprisingly, they found that the
interviewees’ priority was to have a child. One interviewee observed that
although it would be ‘wonderful’ to cure Parkinson’s, ‘really our prior-
ity is just to have a baby’.108 Haimes and Taylor note that ‘[s]everal said
they were happy to donate to research as long as they had first selection
of the embryos and only those not useable for their treatment went to
research’. In their further paper, Haimes and Taylor observe that ‘IVF
is still an evolving field and elements of [the clinic’s] policy have since
changed’.109
Overall, from a legal perspective, there may be two significant pro-
blems with these practices, at least as these are reported in the Haimes
and Taylor papers. First, as indicated in our discussion above, it is pos-
sible that there were inadequacies in the information processes in play.
There is considerable evidence that on some occasions there was a
lack of comprehension as to the reasons behind a decision not to
freeze any embryos from a given treatment cycle and no awareness of
any options (assuming these did exist) to override the freezing policy.
Whether this stemmed from inadequate information is impossible to
assess, given that this study focused on patients’ views and experiences,
but it is at least conceivable that this was the case (and in any event the
HFEA’s requirement for a ‘check’ on patients’ understanding prior to
consent to donation to research, discussed above, should be recalled).
In such cases, the legal requirement that a couple should be appropriate-
ly informed in order to consent to an embryo being ‘spare’ and available
for research would not always be satisfied. Second, in relation to any
couple with between one and three good quality embryos left after
initial embryo transfer, the policy and the way it was apparently
explained in relation to the non-transferred embryos appears to have
compromised the voluntariness of couples’ consent to an embryo
being categorised as ‘spare’, and subsequently their consent to its dona-
tion to research. This is in the sense that (at least as reported in these
papers) many couples were not informed, or not sufficiently informed,
that they may have had the option of overriding the policy (if this
were the case) and thus freezing between one and three remaining
viable (preferably good- or reasonable-quality) embryos. Alternatively,
they were sufficiently informed but nevertheless felt unable to override




109 Haimes and Taylor, above, n 97, 336, n 8.
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We can see that a minimum-number policy (one with the twin criteria
of quantity and quality) has the ability to limit the number of embryos
that are recommended to continue to be available for treatment pur-
poses. With reference to freezing policies generally, a couple’s
‘consent’ to any given embryo being ‘spare’ may be compromised, and
potentially rendered invalid, by flaws relating to information and/or vol-
untariness, which we now summarise with attention also to the material
from our study.
Turning first to the information element, one question will be whether
a couple is adequately informed of the reasons either for the quantity or
the quality criterion or both. Do they have the right to such informa-
tion? Since we have argued that the amended 1990 Act gives couples
some control over their embryos’ use in treatment, they should be
informed of the rationale for any given freezing policy or recommenda-
tion (including the chance of embryos surviving the thaw, the success
rates of the clinic with frozen replacement cycles, and the cost implica-
tions of different choices110) and of their options in relation to the appli-
cation of that policy or recommendation, so that they are able to
override it if they so choose. With regard to freezing policies and
advice generally, Embryologist 34 (Site 1) observed: ‘It shouldn’t
depend what unit you go to, your chances of having your embryos
frozen.’ We saw in Part 1 that Site 3 had a dual quantity and quality
freezing policy, although we found ample evidence (reiterating here
that this was from the viewpoint of the staff that we interviewed) that
patients were informed of the rationale for the policy and their
options in relation to its application to them. However, where a clinic
has a quantity criterion about which a couple has not been adequately
informed, they would be unable to make an informed assessment as
to whether they wish to consent to the disuse of any given embryo in
treatment on the basis that it is ‘spare’, so that this consent, and the
consent to its donation to research that may follow, could be flawed.
Turning to voluntariness, even if a couple is sufficiently informed
about the details of a clinic’s freezing policy—particularly one with a
dual quantity and quality criterion—and how it applies in their case,
we need to consider how they stand in relation to it. Assuming the ap-
plication of the policy amounts to a recommendation, one question
might be whether patients are aware that they are entitled to override
that recommendation and to elect to freeze fewer than the requisite
number (under the policy) of remaining good- or reasonable-quality
embryos and even embryos that are at least viable (though with fewer
110 A number of PCTs fund the stimulation cycle but not the subsequent freez-
ing (£250-850) nor the replacement cycle (£300-990). Personal communica-
tion: Professor Peter Braude, above, n 19.
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chances of success with these). In the clinic we studied that had a dual
quantity/quality policy (Site 3), there was evidence that the staff consid-
ered that this was a matter of patient choice (subject to funding issues) as
we indeed concluded that it must be, by law, at the end of Part
1. Whether patients in that clinic were in fact typically aware that the
choice was theirs would be an important question reflecting on the
quality of the information processes at stake. Questions about patients’
awareness of their choices could also be asked about the two clinics
that had a ‘quality only’ freezing policy, although again we found con-
siderable evidence of staff’s awareness of and keenness to facilitate
patient choice.
A second question regarding voluntariness would be how hard it ac-
tually is for patients to question and potentially override a given recom-
mendation about freezing. We saw in Part 1 regarding the dual quantity/
quality policy at Site 3 that one health professional referred to patients
having to be quite ‘assertive’ and another to cases when patients ‘insist’.
The context of any discussions also needs to be borne in mind here.
Patients undergoing assisted reproduction treatment will typically be
under a lot of pressure (emotional, often financial, and physical for
the woman) and may feel vulnerable.111 There may also be feelings of
indebtedness or gratitude to those assisting them and a wish to please
them, as may occur generally with patients at the interface between
treatment and research and notwithstanding the separation of treatment
and research roles that is emphasised in the HFEA Code.112 In turn,
these factors may affect a couple’s ability to question recommendations
which, of course, there may generally be good reason to trust, as part of
our discussion in Part 1 tried to show.
In short, if the information, voluntariness (or, more rarely, capacity)
elements of the legal concept of consent are compromised for any of
the reasons discussed in this Section B when patients supposedly
‘consent’ to certain embryos being ‘spare’ and passing out of clinical
use to research, that consent may at the least be of poor quality. This
is in the sense that there is a risk that the couple might have decided dif-
ferently. It could also be invalid, with significant implications that we
now spell out.
C. Flawed Consent to Research and Possible Effects on Treatment
First, an invalid consent would be in breach of the consent provisions
under Schedule 3 of the HFE Act 1990 (as amended) compliance with
111 See also eg Holm, above, n 7.
112 HFEA, above, n 6, eg R.27: ‘The centre must establish, implement and
comply with documented procedures to ensure that clinical and research
roles are separated.’
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which, it will be recalled, is a license condition under section 12(1). We
have seen that the Act requires a couple’s consent for various purposes
including treatment and donation to research. The consent to an
embryo’s disuse in treatment would be invalid but so too, flowing
from this, would be a couple’s consent to the use of that embryo in re-
search. As for the legal consequences, under section 18(2) of the
amended 1990 Act, the HFEA ‘may revoke a licence . . . if . . . (b) it is sat-
isfied that the person responsible has failed to discharge . . . the duty
under section 17’. A requirement under section 17(1)(e) is that ‘the con-
ditions of the licence are complied with’. It follows that there could also
be significant breaches of the HFEA Code’s provisions interpreting the
Act. For instance, if a couple has supposedly ‘consented’ to the donation
of an embryo to research in the face of a minimum-number freezing
policy, when in fact they would have chosen to freeze it for future clin-
ical use because it was an embryo of good or reasonable quality, then it
is possible that an embryo with the potential to result in the birth of a
child would have gone to research. Importantly, we have seen that an
embryo that is useful for stem-cell research will be one that can form
a blastocyst with an inner cell mass, exactly the kind with the potential
to result in the birth of a child. In effect, then, and of considerable sig-
nificance, an embryo will have gone to research that may in fact have
been suitable for treatment and therefore ‘required’ for treatment pur-
poses, thinking of the language in the HFEA Code. Recall ‘that only
fresh or frozen . . . embryos not required for treatment can be used for re-
search’.113 (We do not suggest that this has ever been intentional on a
clinic’s part.) In our view, a couple would believe that they require
any embryo that could feasibly lead to a successful pregnancy and it is
irrelevant to them whether that embryo is accompanied by the residual
number a clinic considers appropriate to freeze (subject to any financial
obstacles or other concerns). This is because freezing will increase their
options for further treatment, should this be needed, so that they will
then be able to choose between a frozen-replacement cycle or a
further fresh one (as noted earlier, based on information regarding the
chances of thawing, a clinic’s success with frozen-replacement cycles,
‘banking’ and respective costs).
Moreover, and just as significantly, where one or more embryos goes
to research that may in fact have been suitable for treatment this could
breach the Code’s provision ‘that donating . . . embryos to research in the
course of treatment services will not affect the patient’s treatment in any
way . . . ’.114 To be clear on this point, this is because an embryo with
113 Ibid, above, n 6, para 22.7(h), our emphasis.
114 Ibid, above, n 6, para 22.7(f), our emphasis.
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live-birth potential will have been removed from clinical use. (Again, we
do not suggest that this has ever been intentional.) It is likely that this
could affect treatment outcomes—including by giving rise to the need
for further fresh otherwise avoidable cycles, with all the burdens inher-
ent therein—in at least some cases. As for the consequences of one or
more breaches of the Code, the Code itself is of unclear legal status; al-
though a breach is not an offence, it may be considered by a licence com-
mittee when deciding whether to vary or revoke a licence.115
A couple would have no action in respect of an invalid consent at
common law, since consent to an embryo passing out of the clinic as
‘spare’ and over to the research laboratory does not involve a ‘touching’,
required for an action in battery. As argued, however, consent to an
embryo’s disuse in treatment on the basis that it is ‘spare’ and so to its
availability for research, has the potential to impact on further aspects
of what we called the ‘treatment process’. This is where additional
fresh cycles become necessary because one or more embryos that
could have been frozen and that a couple would have wished to freeze
(assuming for example no financial constraints) were not frozen in a pre-
vious fresh cycle. In such a case, a woman who had not given birth to a
child as a result of the first cycle or who in any event was trying to have
another child, would be ‘consenting’ to an additional fresh cycle on the
incorrect understanding that there were no embryos from the previous
cycle of sufficient quality to freeze or because she understood that she
did not have the option, or felt unable, to request this. Since the subse-
quent fresh cycle should have been avoidable even if only one embryo
had been frozen (here she could also elect to ‘bank’ embryos), the volun-
tariness and information elements of her consent to it are also compro-
mised. As for the legal consequences, further treatment will involve
various touchings (blood tests, egg retrieval, embryo transfer) and so a
battery action would at least be theoretically possible, but proof of
such a claim would be hugely complex and fraught with difficulty.
III. ENHANCING THE QUALITY OF CONSENT
AND PROTECTING REPRODUCTIVE OPTIONS
For the reasons identified above, seeking consent for the donation of
fresh embryos to research may affect the quality and on occasion validity
of consent, with various possible impacts on patients. Accordingly,
couples should not be approached for consent to the donation of their
embryos to research at least until they have decided not to undergo
any further treatment, and preferably not until their frozen embryos
115 Jackson, above, n 71, 766.
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are coming to the end of their statutory storage term, at which point
their reproductive wishes in relation to those embryos cannot change.
Significantly, this is to recommend that couples should not be
approached for the donation of fresh embryos to research (with a few
exceptions that we discuss below). Although the ideal of ‘fully informed
consent’ is most likely unattainable,116 the information, voluntariness,
and capacity elements of consent are likely to be satisfied as much as
would ever be possible (an important caveat) at the point where no
further treatment can be sought using those embryos (because of the
expiry of the statutory storage term).117 The point of this recommenda-
tion is to enhance the legal quality of various consents, to avoid some
invalid consents, to avoid a possible impact on the treatment process,
and to maximise a couple’s treatment, and therefore reproductive,
options since embryos are a distinctly finite resource for them. Research
can proceed with frozen embryos (subject to some exceptions regarding
fresh embryos noted below).
Our recommendation is echoed by elements of the scientific and clin-
ical community in the UK. For instance, Stephenson and others—noting
that the kind of embryo that is good for stem-cell research is the kind
that may be good for pregnancy, and also the unpredictability of
embryo development (so that an embryo that is assessed on day three
as being of poor quality may in fact develop into a blastocyst on day
five or six)—argue that ‘it is ethically questionable whether the use of
“surplus” embryos for stem cell derivation is in the best interests of
the IVF patients trying to maximise their chances of pregnancy’.118
Given the increasing use of blastocyst culture, they therefore suggest
that ‘the ethical source’ of embryos for research will shift to ‘frozen
embryos or affected PGD embryos’.119
Our recommendation is also in accord with the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine, whose Ethics Committee has recommended
that ‘[t]he final decisions on the donation of embryos to ES cell or
other research must occur after the patients’ infertility needs are met
or the patients discontinue therapy’, reasoning:
It is important that patients decide to donate embryos for research
only after they have decided not to continue storing their embryos.
116 For recent discussion, see N Manson and O O’Neill, Rethinking Informed
Consent in Bioethics (CUP, Cambridge 2007).
117 Such embryos would be what Søren Holm has called ‘finally spare’, and in
relation to which there would be no possibility of coercion. Above, n 7, 66.
118 EL Stephenson, C Mason, and PR Braude, ‘Preimplantation Genetic Diag-
nosis as a Source of Human Embryonic Stem Cells for Disease Research
and Drug Discovery’ (2008) BJOG 158–65, 159.
119 Ibid.
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Making separate decisions about no longer using embryos and do-
nating them for research guards against pressure being placed on
patients to donate embryos. . . . Using only frozen embryos for re-
search ensures that time passes between the creation of embryos
for conception and their donation for research . . . Donation of
fresh embryos . . . increases the chance that decisions will be made
quickly and later regretted by patients.120
We draw attention here to the emphasis on separate decisions about not
using embryos on the one hand and donating them on the other.
Further, from an ethical viewpoint, Carolyn McLeod and Franc¸oise
Baylis have argued that donation of fresh embryos to research is
against the interests of female IVF patients, and that ‘autonomous’
consent to such may be compromised by misunderstandings or
coercion.121
There are a few exceptions to our recommendation. First, there may
be embryos that are clearly not viable. (These will in fact be of no use
in stem-cell research but may be of some use in other research, or in
training embryologists.) Second, a couple may not wish to freeze
embryos, for instance for religious reasons, or may be unable to do so
for financial ones. Financial difficulties may, unfortunately, compromise
voluntariness. In this case, if the couple prefers to give the embryos to
research rather than let them perish, then donating to research may be
of some value to them in these less than ideal circumstances. Third,
embryos that have tested positive by PGD may be discarded unless
used for research, although this may turn on whether there are other
viable embryos from a treatment cycle, and also of course the couple’s
wishes. This is because the revised HFEA Code, with reference to the
amended 1990 Act, stipulates only that such embryos ‘must not be pre-
ferred’122 at the point of transfer, that is, if ‘there is at least one other
embryo suitable for transfer that is not known to have the characteris-
tics’.123 (Whether couples could in fact elect to freeze these ‘affected’
embryos is unclear but in any event ‘[t]he use of an embryo known to
have an abnormality . . . should be subject to consideration of the
welfare of any resulting child and should normally have approval
from a clinical ethics committee’ (that is, with reference to section
120 American Society for Reproductive Medicine: Ethics Committee Report,
‘Donating Spare Embryos for Stem Cell Research’, (2009) 91/3 Fertil
Steril, 667–670. The Committee expressed the same view in its earlier
opinion in 2002.
121 C McLeod and F Baylis, ‘Donating Fresh Versus Frozen Embryos to Stem
Cell Research: in Whose Interests?’ (2007) 21/9 Bioethics 465–77.
122 HFEA, above, n 6, T86 and T87.
123 Ibid, ‘Interpretation of Mandatory Requirements’, Box 10C.
298 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2012]
13(5) of the amended 1990 Act).124) However, a couple who has chosen
PGD for a serious inheritable condition is unlikely to wish to have an
‘affected’ embryo transferred or frozen and is more likely to consent
to such embryos passing out of treatment use as ‘spare’. In all the
cases noted here (subject to the caveat just discussed regarding ‘affected’
PGD embryos), it would be legitimate to request the donation of fresh
embryos to research, including stem-cell research. The same would
apply, for instance, to an embryo that was in some way the result of ab-
normal fertilisation.
Our recommendation and the exceptions are also in line with what we
dub the ‘ethical priority’ in the use of embryos for research discussed by
some of our research participants. Genetics Scientist 33 (Site 1) sug-
gested that ‘affected’ PGD embryos were the most ethically unproblem-
atic, followed by frozen and lastly fresh embryos, in relation to which
s/he had significant concerns. This hierarchy was supported by a
number of other participants. Embryologist 34 (Site 1) said fresh
embryos should never be requested because an embryo that would be
good for treatment might go to research. Stem-cell Scientist 35 (Site 1)
reasoned:125 ‘[W]e don’t agree with the use of fresh non-PGD
embryos . . . the patients aren’t here to give us research material,
they’re here to get pregnant . . . they get all the embryos that have any
possible chance of . . . pregnancy’ and described requests for fresh
embryos as ‘a whole other can of worms which we avoid here.’ Embry-
ologist 7 (Site 3) observed that the ‘ideal time is to use the frozen
embryos when people have gone through their [treatment] . . . [W]hen
they’re in a consultation . . . they’re there to get pregnant and have treat-
ment, they’re not there to think about research’.126 Lastly on this point,
Genetics Scientist 33 (Site 1) observed: ‘So . . . that one would always
remove the argument that you’re actually taking for stem-cell research
. . . embryos which could have been replaced . . . These ones are the
frozen ones at the end of their storage time, aren’t required any more.’
In recommending that fresh embryos should not be sought for
research (subject to the exceptions discussed) we note that, although
in the past live-birth rates using fresh rather than frozen embryos have
been higher, that gap has now narrowed considerably, especially with
blastocyst freezing and SET.127 Further, since blastocyst culture is
124 Ibid, para 10.7.
125 Our emphasis.
126 Our emphasis.
127 For recent evidence, see eg T El-Toukhy and others, ‘Delayed Blastocyst De-
velopment Does Not Influence the Outcome of Frozen–thawed Transfer
Cycles’ (2011) 118 BJOG 1551–6. See also W Schoolcraft and others,
‘Live Birth Outcome with Trophectoderm Biopsy, Blastocyst Vitrification,
and Single-nucleotide Polymorphism Microarray-based Comprehensive
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increasingly becoming the norm, and with it the freezing of blastocysts,
the worry that freezing embryos may give ‘false hope’ to a couple will be
reduced. Overall, as we have indicated, our recommendation is aimed at
protecting reproductive interests by maximising treatment options. So,
for example, if a woman does not give birth to a child as a result of
her first cycle of IVF, she can then elect either to have a frozen replace-
ment cycle, provided that embryos from the previous cycle have been
frozen where possible, or to undergo the risks of another fresh cycle.
Alternatively, if she does give birth to a child but later wishes to have
another child, a minimum period of about fifteen months will ensue
between her first and second cycles of IVF. During this time, her fertility
will have declined—particularly if she is not young, as is often the case
with IVF—so that she may respond less well to the stimulation drugs in a
second fresh cycle. In this event, again it is preferable that she also has
the option of using frozen embryos created in her first cycle if she wishes.
This protection of reproductive interests may come at the ‘cost’ of
generating greater numbers of potentially difficult decisions that have
to be made about the disposition of frozen embryos that are no longer
needed, although the increasing practice of freezing blastocysts will in
fact reduce the number of embryos that are frozen. (Of course, freezing
also has financial costs, as noted earlier.) In this light, before consenting
to freezing, patients should be advised of these possible difficulties.128
Later on, when disposition decisions have to be made, the role of sup-
portive counselling might be further explored and emphasised, as sug-
gested elsewhere.129 We do not have the scope further to discuss this
here. We would emphasise, however, that along with advice as to the
possible difficulties of making decisions about embryos that are not
needed any more, couples should also be advised that freezing sufficient-
ly good non-transferred embryos will help maximise their treatment
options, and hence best protect their reproductive interests, over time.
Chromosome Screening in Infertile Patients’ (2011) 96/3 Fertil Steril
638–40 (which also involved biopsy for chromosome testing).
128 For discussion of couples’ highly personal views about their embryos and
how this contributes to the difficulties of making decisions about frozen
embryos, see eg R Nachtigall and others, ‘Parents’ Conceptualization of
their Frozen Embryos Complicates the Disposition Decision’ (2005) 84/2
Fertil Steril 431–4. There is a significant body of literature on this issue.
129 For discussion of ways to help people make decisions about frozen embryos,
see eg G Fuscaldo and others, ‘How to Facilitate Decisions about Surplus
Embryos: Patients’ Views’ (2007) 22/12 Human Reproduction 3129–38;
K Hug, ‘Motivation to Donate or Not Donate Surplus Embryos for Stem-
Cell Research: Literature Review’ (2008) 89/2 Fertil Steril, 263–77, 274.
On the question of what information should be given to couples before
they freeze their embryos see S de Lacey, ‘Patients’ Attitudes to their
Embryos and their Destiny: Social Conditioning?’ (2007) 21 Best Pract
Res Clin Obstet Gynaecol 101–12.
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Finally, we support our recommendation with reference to a critique
of recent case law and subsequent legislative developments. In Evans v
UK,130 embryos were created with the gametes of Ms Evans and
Mr Johnson with a view to immediate freezing and subsequent use in
assisted reproduction treatment following ovarian cancer treatment
for Ms Evans. Mr Johnson subsequently withdrew his consent to the
embryos’ continued storage or use in treatment. In proceedings that
went as far as the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human
Rights, Ms Evans unsuccessfully challenged the provisions of the (un-
amended) HFE Act 1990 that required such embryos to be allowed to
perish once one gamete-provider withdraws his or her consent to contin-
ued storage or use.131 While it remains the case that once one member of
a couple has withdrawn consent for use or continued storage any given
embryo must be allowed to perish, the amended HFE Act 1990 now spe-
cifies that, to allow time for reflection, there should be a ‘cooling-off’
period of one year between the time that one member of a couple with-
draws consent to the continued storage or use of an embryo in treatment
and the destruction of that embryo.132 There is now, therefore, an expli-
cit legal recognition (at least regarding the situation relevant to separat-
ing couples) that the option to use an embryo in treatment needs to be
protected because of possible changes of mind. The finite nature of
the resource that embryos are is implicit in this development. Evans is
also of significance because it effectively highlights the importance of
attending to the quality of the consent actually given in any case, as
Sally Sheldon has argued.133 Her analysis concerns the quality of
consent to the creation of embryos for treatment purposes (which in
Evans was given in highly charged emotional circumstances under pres-
sure of time). However, by analogy, her critique affirms the importance
of attending to the quality of actual consents in general. Such consents
could encompass consent, in the first instance, to the disuse of an
embryo in treatment on the basis that it is ‘spare’ and so, potentially,
to its use in research, and consent to one or more possibly otherwise
avoidable subsequent fresh treatment cycles. Our criticisms of the U v
Centre for Reproductive Medicine case, in which the Court of Appeal
arguably insufficiently attended to the quality of a withdrawal of
consent, are also in point here.134
130 46 EHRR 34.
131 HFE Act 1990 (as amended), above, n 1, Sched 3, para 8(2).
132 Ibid, Sched 3, para 4A(4)(a).
133 S Sheldon, ‘Evans v. Amicus Health Care: Revealing Cracks in the “Twin
Pillars”’, (2004) 16 Child and Family Law Quarterly 437–52, 443.
134 Above, n 59.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
In the course of our analysis of the process of consent to the donation of
so-called ‘spare’ embryos to research, we have highlighted a fact that
may be little known in the debate about embryo research: namely,
that a good research embryo may well be a good treatment embryo, par-
ticularly with regard to stem-cell research. No-one who has had to resort
to assisted reproduction treatment in order to start or add to a family
would give away fresh embryos of this kind by choice.135 In this light,
it is unsurprising that having completed IVF treatment has been cited
as one factor contributing to couples’ willingness to donate embryos
to research, along with having non-viable embryos.136 We recommend
that only frozen embryos that are, preferably, coming to the end of
their statutory storage time should be sought for research (apart from
the exceptions discussed).137 This is intended to enhance the quality,
and protect the validity, of what we have shown to be three related
consent processes: consent to an embryo’s disuse in treatment on the
basis that it is ‘spare’ (as it must be for legal purposes, for instance, at
the end of the statutory storage term); consent to its donation to research
on this basis; and, similarly, consent to a further cycle or cycles of
assisted reproduction treatment, should one or more be needed. (In
the latter case, where for example no embryos could be frozen from a
given cycle, a woman’s consent to a further stimulation cycle would
be on the correct understanding that the fresh cycle was indeed unavoid-
able.) At the same time, our recommendation aims to maximise the
treatment, and therefore reproductive, options of couples needing
assisted reproduction treatment.138 In so doing, it recognises the finite
135 For evidence of this, see eg S Parry, ‘(Re)constructing Embryos in Stem Cell
Research: Exploring the Meaning of Embryos for People involved in Fertility
Treatments’ (2006) 62/10 Social Science and Medicine 2349–59.
136 See especially K Hug, above, n 129, 275, who also lists other factors. See
also Parry, above, n 135, for further UK evidence that ‘only when classified
as unsuitable for reproductive treatments did participants consider their use
in medical research as potentially legitimate’ (at 2353).
137 (Of course, as noted earlier, couples can choose a storage term of less than
the statutory maximum, and can then elect to extend the term if they wish.)
We acknowledge Haimes’ and Taylor’s interesting alternative suggestion
that couples should not be approached for donation to research in their
first cycle of IVF because (amongst other reasons) in subsequent cycles
they ‘would be better informed by experience and reflection, as well as by
documentation, about the possible uses of their embryos, whatever the
quality’. Haimes and Taylor, above n 97, 340; see also above n 94, 2149.
However, for all the reasons argued here, we frame our recommendation
more strongly. In the course of our argument, we believe we have addressed
(to the extent that space has allowed) their various reasons for rejecting
McLeod’s and Baylis’s suggestion that the donation of fresh embryos to re-
search is not in patients’ interests. McLeod and Baylis, above n 121.
138 Of course, single women may also undergo treatment using donated sperm.
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resource that embryos are for any given couple. This protection of repro-
ductive interests is appropriate since those embryos that pass to the re-
search laboratory from the clinic do so as a result of the cycles of
treatment that couples undergo to try to have children.
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